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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

As Western civilization hurtles towards an unknown destiny, the Christian Church stirs from its complacency and ponders anew the meaning of history. No longer can it be satisfied with the course of events as Protestantism, especially, was inclined to be during the optimistic nineteenth century. Under the impact of secularization, war, social strife, and totalitarianism Christianity is regaining consciousness of its world historical mission. Everywhere concern for the Kingdom of God is coming to the fore. This tendency is manifest, however, among the conservative Christians by a general inclination to regard themselves confirmed in their fundamental distrust of man in view of the ominous developments in our irreligious civilization and by their withdrawal from further participation in the decisions of the world, holding that man is completely incapable of extricating himself from the Chaos into which he has plunged. These conservative Christians believe that man can do nothing about the Kingdom, except repent, that man will be God's subject only when God deems fit. In contrast, the liberal Christians, though sobered by the forebodings which have depressed our century, nevertheless hope that Christianity will succeed in defying the downward historical trend and vigorously participate in realizing a more just social order than the societies we now know. Confidence in the coming of an earthly Kingdom and ardent endeavor towards its fulfillment bulk large in the life and thought especially of the American churches which have been among the first in recent times to recognize the social responsibility of Christianity. These liberal Christians assume

that man is master of his destiny and proclaim that the Kingdom will come if man but strive hard enough, for at long last, civilization has provided the ample means for a transformation.

Under the onslaughts of world disruption Christianity, conservative and liberal alike, thus maintains that only as we live within God's Kingdom shall we gain salvation; but conservative Christians hold that the Kingdom will be ushered in by God alone, while liberal Christians believe that man is the only possible instrumentality of God in the realization of His Kingdom.

Those two extreme views of the Kingdom, transcendent and immanent, have been stated simply and without qualification, for it is their sheer contrast which best introduces the relevancy to the present situation in world of the problem of sin. For the choice of sin as the subject of a dissertation in a liberal theological school surely requires some defense. And the writer finds this justification in the fact that the liberal view of the Kingdom, which most Unitarians hold, is strangely lacking in any very penetrating conception of sin, to say nothing of a profound sense of guilt. And yet Jesus himself went about saying: "Repent ye for the Kingdom of God is at hand." The liberal seems to have forgotten the necessity of repentance. Moreover he has long regarded himself unconsciously as a citizen of a future Kingdom for which he labors; but properly, a man cannot be a citizen of a kingdom, rather is he the subject of a king. It seems to the writer that the liberal Christian must consider well whether the Kingdom is a symbol for the good society regardless of its eventual constitutional form, in which case the word can be considered an archaism justified liturgically and poetically, or whether the Kingdom is the symbol of spiritual humbling before a vast Power that reigns over us, in which case we are obliged

to reconsider the theological concepts of sin, repentance, and justification by faith. It is in the mood of this latter conception of the Kingdom that the present study is written. Assuming, however, that man is the subject of a King, the vassal of the Lord of history, the study concludes with the conviction that the Lord of history works through man and in such a way that the liberal immanent and the orthodox transcendent insight into the nature of God's Kingdom are dynamically fused. Paul Tillich, who is both a Lutheran and a socialist, has done signal service to Christianity in pointing out at this critical time the interrelationship of the transcendent and the immanent Kingdom.

The writer further defends his choice of sin as the subject of a liberal dissertation on the ground that just as repentance is related to social salvation and the Kingdom, so is it related to personal salvation and the religious life. The conviction that lies behind this assertion is that an awakened sense of sin is the first stage of God consciousness, that the core of Christianity is the doctrine of sin while its heart is grace, that indeed without a sense of sin and repentance there can be no experience of grace, and that without the infusion of grace church life sinks to mere club life. For without grace there prevails no light, warmth, solemn joy, and power for justice. Sin and grace are the reverse and the obverse of the same tremendous Christian experience. As Tillich says, evil possession and blessedness correspond to each other; demonic and divine overwhelming are correlates as are also inspiration and distraction.¹ Sin consciousness and grace belong together as do the toilsome ascent and the glorious mountain view. Most people, however, live today in the familiar valleys cultivated by technical civi-

¹Daem 14

lization, that is to say, they are unmindful of sin and grace. To change the comparison, religious liberalism without a quickened sense of sin and an enduring experience of grace will be at best a bouquet of flowers plucked from an old garden, beautiful, but cut off from the ground of life, no longer capable of living cross fertilization and hence unable to produce seeds that will germinate in generations to come. The centrality of sin in the theology of traditional Christianity, in Christ's teaching of the Kingdom, and also in the concern even of the most saintly and religiously serious attest to the importance of sin in the life of religion and commend the doctrine to review and reconsideration.

Paul Tillich throws light over the whole problem of sin and grace by underlining the fact that Christ came into the world to save sinners and that as Christianity is a universal religion, so also sin must be construed as a universal condition of man. Moreover, man must realize his sin before he can be saved. Tillich is well aware, however, of the difficulties confronting the churchman who asserts that man is universally sinful. The self-sufficient, modern man, the complacent valley-dweller, is inclined to regard the preacher's exhortation concerning sin as much ado about a theological figment. He tends to surmise that the churchman stresses sin until the poor churchgoer finally thinks he really is sinful and that when the preacher declares the sins forgiven, he merely removes what he originally imputed, piously calling the relief experienced 'grace'. The complacent nominal Christian, if he thinks of evil at all, is thus inclined to mock the theological notion of sin, satisfying himself with the explanation of evil as failure to make adjustment. In view of the difficulty of making sin seem real,

Tillich looks about and finds in the social realm the most compelling confirmations of the theological doctrine of man's universal implication in sin. "Since the victory of humanism and autonomy in the Protestant areas," Tillich writes, "it is now no longer possible to deepen individual sin consciousness to the point where it acquires significance in the life and activity of the church. All pistic attempts in this direction must remain of limited effect. But there does exist, however, a consciousness of guilt that only awaits being deepened. This is the consciousness of the domination of the Demonic¹ especially in the social order in which all participate and because of which all alike are guilty. This consciousness of participation can, however, be deepened only in a powerful breaking through of basic revelation, out of which can then come also a new individual guilt consciousness.² It is thus the task of the Protestant church to deepen the sensitiveness to sin, especially in our time social sin, to the end that society will be quickened to an awareness of its wickedness and by repentance and contriteness of heart prepare itself and society for the reception of God's grace, so that eventually completely interfused church and society will become a more nearly perfect symbol of the Kingdom.

The doctrine of sin is thus seen to be vital to a full understanding of the devout personal and the devout social life, and we turn to Paul Tillich for an enrichment of the concept.

Unfortunately Tillich has not yet undertaken a systematic study of sin. The nearest that he has come to a direct analysis of the doctrine is in the last third of his licentiate dissertation on guilt consciousness and mysticism in the philoso-

¹The tendency towards creative-destructive onesidedness and distortion.

²Rechtf 3.

phy of Schelling, in his booklet on the Demonic, and in his paper on justification and doubt. Nevertheless it is possible on the basis of these three writings and his widely scattered chapters, articles, book reviews, and booklets to construct a richly textured and tremendously instructive doctrine of sin which should prove helpful in empowering, deepening, and solemnizing the worship and worshipful activity of the liberal American churches. In a special way the following study may also contribute indirectly to a dynamic synthesis of the humanist and theist emphases within the Unitarian denomination.

PART I

A SUMMARY OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TILlich'S THEOLOGY

A. THE DYNAMIC OF TIME: TIME AND SPACE THINKING

PART I

A SUMMARY OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TILLICH'S THEOLOGY

A. The Dynamic of Time: Time and Space Thinking:

1. The Hebrew-Hellenic Contrast

Tillich has thus far written no systematic theology, nor has he discussed even his understanding of sin and salvation in relation to the traditional doctrines. It has therefore seemed fitting that his thought on sin and salvation be introduced only after his theology is given in outline for the sake of readers who are unfamiliar with his writings.

Throughout Tillich's writings there are two principles which recur with such frequency and stress that it is soon apparent that they are the pillars of his theological structure. It seems therefore appropriate that his thought be summarized under two corresponding headings: (A.) The Dynamic of Time; and, dependant thereon, (B.) The Paradoxical Nature of God.

Like many other theological and philosophical thinkers today, Tillich distinguishes cultural traditions which are time-conscious and those which are space-minded. The Hebrews¹ represent the former preeminently; the Greeks² exemplify the latter. Space cultures are bound to the land which becomes hallowed. Soil, blood, and race play a prominent rôle. In religion the priestly element dominates in contrast to the prophetic.³ For

¹Time-minded cultures can become space-minded and vice versa.

²Rv 111-2.

³Tillich distinguishes between the warm, healing, sus-

such cultures there is no conception of true history; the Greeks, for example, had their chronicles but no true philosophy of history.¹ As the seasons come and go only to return, so history is thought of as seasonal or cyclical. Most cultures have been space-minded. Jewish culture in its formative period constitutes, however, a notable departure from space-bound, land-bound thinking, for the Jews and their ancestors the Hebrews have always been characteristically detached from the soil. And in their formative period they were a people bound by a Covenant to God and not by blood ties. They have been nomads, sojourners in the land, city dwellers, exiles, and world wanderers, seldom established long enough in one place to acquire an attachment to a particular locale and hence to become space-conscious. For wherever they have, their prophetic blood has stirred, and some of their number have arisen as prophets to shake them out of

taining, chthonic forces which are impounded by sacramentalism and the challenging, creative forces that are manifest in prophetic theocracy. He associates the former with the motherly element in the world and the latter with the fatherly element. Catholicism, absorbing and transforming the folk culture of whatever land it becomes established in, is full of this sacramental motherly substance that heals. Protestantism insofar as it is true to its principle is prophetic. Unfortunately, however, Protestantism has lost its prophetic direction and has been so stripped by the Reformers, notably Calvin and Zwingli, that it can provide little of the binding substance which our world so desperately needs. Whence it is that many despairing ones pass over to the Catholic Church even though the Church does almost nothing about the social problems of the day. As we shall see more fully, Tillich believes that a church must have both the priestly and prophetic elements, that is to say the healing grace and the grace of righteous indignation.

¹Tillich distinguishes between Geschichte and Historie. In Geschichte something new and truly eventful geschieht. In Historie nothing new happens, only the same old fights, intrigues, rises, and declines, for there is nothing new under the sun; a man who has lived forty years alertly has seen everything that can be.

their quiescence or complacency. Abraham led his family out of Ur, Moses led the tribes out of Egypt, the Josian reformers denounced the veneration at the local shrines, and history destroyed thrice even the central shrine at Jerusalem, until finally the Jews have become a history-conscious people, seeing the hand of God in the rise and decline of civilizations.¹

In this dynamic conception of God in time, the Eternal is thought of as breaking into history, but elusively so that God can be pointed to only in his mighty works like the escape from Egypt and the giving of the Law. Judaism has always resisted the attempt to objectify God; it has been savage in its attack on graven images, for it has grasped the inexhaustibility of God² who moves in mysterious ways, rocking and shaking history by his decrees.

¹Tillich has remarked that Judaism today shows a tendency to become space-bound, first through its espousal of Zionism and the return to a holy land and secondly through its loss of socially and prophetically minded Jews (that is to say, the time-conscious or history-minded Jews) to the cause of Communism. Moreover the Jews through their racially conditioned religion-culture have always been in danger of becoming space-bound, for blood is one of the categories of space thinking. The fate of the Jews, preeminently the time thinkers, has been thus to become partially space-minded to their own disadvantage through being forced by an actively or potentially hostile Gentile environment to stress sacramentalism and enforce racialism. Indeed even their eschatological hope of a return from the Diaspora to Zion has become more and more a space-conscious notion in that it is more akin to Greek cyclic thinking than to the prophetic spirit.

²The Jews of course spoke of God anthropomorphically. Tillich does not regard their anthropomorphism, however, as detracting from their realization of God's inexhaustibility. Consciously or unconsciously they were aware that Jehovah transcended the merely superhuman king-god of surrounding peoples. The Jews used "hand", "breath", "heart" as characteristic of God in a symbolic way.

2. Kairos.

The importance for Tillich's thought of the Hebrew insight into the significance of time and history will become abundantly clear when we discuss sin and salvation, for Tillich applies the prophetic principle to both sin and salvation, the interpretation of which has long been dominated by Hellenic space-thinking.

In the dynamic understanding of God and history, first vouchsafed to the Hebrews, Tillich sees existence torn from out its spatial bondage and given an irreversible direction which means not the diminution of existence but rather the intensification of existence, for time presents potentialities or tensions between what is and what might be so that through the exercise of free choice something new can be brought forth. That is to say, man is fated to be what and where he is, yet time holds him in a tension between this necessity and the potentiality of exercising free choice to loosen the tension in a creative direction so that something truly eventful geschieht in Geschichte. Being is thus made meaningful through the creation of the new.¹ Space thinking, on the other hand, fails to recognize the possibilities inherent in time, so that a completely sacramental society merely unfolds, it never makes saltations. Consequently in its cumbersome unfolding whole sections of a society may be blindly rolled upon and crushed, and yet this destruction will be defended sacramentally, that is, the priests will deplore the plight and yet maintain that it must be for so it has always been.² It is the prophet who rises up and declares that something new can be created which will preserve and yet correct the religion-culture.

¹Rv 112.

²When a sacramental space culture or religion has become thus actually oppressive Tillich calls it a heteronomy.

The prophet is impelled by the realization that the Eternal breaks through, sometimes even to destroy, in order to create new forms. In the prophetic sense of time there prevails no simple contrast between the Eternal and time, for the prophet grasps that the Eternal is significant in time and not above time. The Eternal is the bearer of time. Thus all time, past, present, and future, has a transcendent reference, of which, however, only the prophetically minded are keenly conscious. All moments of time are alike significant and insignificant; they are both borne and shattered by the Eternal.¹ Accordingly there is in time thinking or, theologically expressed, in eschatological thinking, the hope that through being shattered by the Almighty, society may assume God-mindful or God-filled forms and thereby become a more nearly perfect symbol of Eternity.²

A society is especially in need of the prophetic voice and vision when history passes into a crises. An historical situation contains the potentiality of significant mutation, that is to say it is dialectic, when it produces within itself, from inner structural necessity, contradictions which can lead, with the aid of human decision, to some new situation in which these contradictions can be resolved. Freedom and necessity are thus interwoven in the background of man's decision. If man does not accept the responsibility, the decree remains unfulfilled, and developments begin again from the beginning to arrive at the same goal while the tendencies or potentialities provided by the historical process remain unused.³ Whoever

¹Rv 132, 1 Kai 4.

²Rl 117-8. Tillich calls such a society a theonomy, a society that is open to God.

³This waste and failure is as we shall see the fundamental element in sin, for Tillich, the prophet, understands sin primarily as God's controversy with His people.

destroys this union between dialectic necessity and human freedom, misses the import of our historical existence.¹ This, however, is precisely what space thinking fails to grasp.

For the historical situation which requires our affirmative decision in order to move forward, Tillich employs a special word, Kairos, the fulness of time which demands decision and creation. In reference to the fulness of time the Eternal is thought of as the Eschaton which, without losing its transcendent character, stands both as a judgment against society and as a norm for a new one. Mythotheologically expressed the Eschaton is both the Kingdom, corresponding to the norm and fulfillment, and the Last Judgment, corresponding to the decision or judgment of man. Of this we shall have more to say when we come to discuss salvation from sin. Suffice it to say that Kairos is the fulness of time in the sense of being time confronted with the fulness of the Eternal and confronted therefore with the necessity of epoch-making decision. This fulness is apparent in the surging up of a new historical form of grace.² For the Transcendent expressing itself in time must become manifest in some form.³ Protestantism was once such a form, rendering the age of the Reformation especially momentous. Our age is likewise Kairic because the Transcendent is manifesting itself prophetically in the proletariat, which Tillich therefore calls a Form

¹For the whole paragraph, see Marx 27-8.

²2 Kai 35.

³Even prophetic grace must take form otherwise it cannot become manifest. Tillich recognizes that the Reformer's understanding of grace went too far in destroying the Catholic idea of grace as a substance in form, although the Protestants were right in criticizing the absolutization of the Holy in sacred acts and objects. The truly Protestant position is, according to Tillich, that grace appears in forms though it can never be capsuled or encased in forms. By its nature it transcends forms. Thus he resorts to the expression "a Form of grace", that is a form in which grace works.

of grace that comes to us in our dire historical necessity to give salvation to society. Kairos today is the historical occasion of the Eternal's creative-fateful break into time and history, in such a way that the Transcendent, manifesting itself within a rational form, the proletariat, confronts the Christian with the grace of social salvation, which brings with it an inescapable responsibility and a demand for an irrevocable decision for or against. And yet the Christian dare not objectify or absolutize that Form,¹ lest it too become as onesided and monstrous as the capitalism against which it rises in righteous indignation. Tillich's great concern is that Christians and socialists realize that now is the hour of decision. His is the prophetic proclamation that the hour cometh and now is when Protestantism² and socialism must each grasp the significance of the other and, joining forces, give meaning to our time.³ For there comes a tide in the history of the West, which taken at the flood leads nearer to the Kingdom; omitted, all the voyage of our century will be bound in shallows and in miseries. The proletariat and the Church can together³ make history, divided, witness the complete catastrophe of our century.

¹As do the Communists. See the section on demonizations, #16.

²He does not think that Catholicism holds the future of Christianity.

³As we shall see more fully in the sections to follow, Tillich shows that both the priestly and the prophetic are necessary for a healthy, theonomous society. Today there is grave danger that the Church will be sloughed off by society because society will despair of an institution that is not concerned with its problems. And yet should the Church go, with it would go a vital element, the sacramental, warm, and healing grace. Nor is Protestantism, stripped as it is, entirely lacking in the sacramental and binding grace. Without it the prophetic outburst can be only bitter, savage, and hard, resorting finally to a hollow political sacramentalism. Tillich cites Communism and Nazism.

B. THE PARADOXICAL NATURE OF GOD

B. The Paradoxical Nature of God.

#3. Kairos and Logos.

In the foregoing paragraphs we have seen how Tillich has ranged himself in the long tradition of the time thinkers - a tradition that runs through the high prophecy of Israel and the eschatology of early Christianity, passing underground, submerged partly under Hellenic influence, during the static medieval centuries, only to reappear in some sections of Protestantism and also in several modern philosophical and political forms. We have seen that the insight of the time thinkers is that the Eternal is not an Unmoved Mover but the Lord God of Hosts, that is, that the Eternal is dynamic and not static, and secondly, that precisely because the Eternal is Transcendent it must deny all conditioning forms. There can be no holy objects, places, and acts except as they deny themselves to point beyond. God is primarily the Lord of history, rendering it dynamic, ever creative-destructive, but potentially meaningful if man but decide for the Eternal.

We turn now from the dynamic of time to its implications for religious knowledge. Within Christian development Tillich distinguishes three fundamental approaches in religious knowledge, two of which are not dynamic. The medieval Catholic way holds the Object of the religious quest to be not only static but also superrational. God is the Supernatural who vouchsafes to man through Revelation the materials which he is then free to work over and systematize by means of reason. There is secondly the classical, humanist approach which likewise holds

its Object or Absolute to be static. The humanist approach differs from the Catholic in regarding the Absolute as accessible to the reason without recourse to any form of grace or intuition. The humanist regards his own vantage point as absolute and assumes that God can be conceived as the highest synthesis of human thought, the Ideal. Both of these static approaches tend to deny that knowledge is in time. Thirdly there is the approach which Tillich himself follows as a result of his dynamic time consciousness, and for which he appropriates the designation "Protestant", because Luther made such distinguished use of it. In this powerful, though slender tradition are to be found in addition to Luther and the prophets, also Duns Scotus, Boehme, and Schelling. The "Protestant" approach, in contrast to the humanist and Catholic, holds God to be dynamic and deeper than the reaches of reason, that is, like the Catholic the "Protestant" recognizes that God is beyond reason, not as the Supernatural but as the Paradoxical. The "Protestant" epistemology recognizes that man's knowledge must be ever limited by his historical situation, by his place in time. Man can never behold the truth shimmering in an Above or Beyond apart from historical exigencies. It is therefore presumptuous to assume, as do Classicism and Catholicism, that man can think timelessly. At most it may be vouchsafed to him to glimpse the Transcendent in time. Tillich denotes the gulf between the dynamic tradition in philosophy and theology as over against the two static traditions, along with their mystical variants,¹ in the concept Kairos over against Logos. Logos is the conception of the Eternal Truth for which both Catholic and

¹That is to say, both Catholicism and humanism can be radically mystical. Mysticism is sacramentalism carried to an extreme, dissolving the forms to become one with the Eternal behind the forms. Catholicism can become mysticism in St. Theresa. Classicism can become mysticism in Platinus.

classicist philosopher seeks. Kairos, which is not exactly a coordinate term, is, as we have seen, the fulness of time which demands decision for or against the Eternal. The quest of the dynamic tradition in terms of the static tradition is thus to grasp the Logos in Kairos. It is the quest of an Eternal One that moves, while Catholicism and humanism seek to distinguish a static One from the flux of the many.

Tillich asserts that the "Protestant" position is a peripheral position. That is to say, the dynamic thinker is the one who finds himself on the frontier in contrast to the center.¹ The humanist and the Catholic work from the center out. They seldom feel the challenge of other though complexes. The "Protestant" however stands on the border between complexes and is thus privileged to see the strength and weakness of all systems from a vantage point.² In other words, the "Protestant" is a critic, a prophet. Luther stood this side of the completion of the Catholic system and was thus in a position to criticize it. "Luther came to know Catholicism as it was about to pass over its own border. From the border he was thus able to give Protestantism all the fundamental thoughts."³ Similarly the high prophets

¹Tillich explains the tremendous creativity of Augustine, who, though not prophetic, was nevertheless of the dynamic tradition (cf. his interpretation of history), by his historical vantage point on the watershed between Antiquity and the Middle Ages.

²Tillich is preeminently a "Protestant", for he stands or has stood on many borders: Between country and city; between pre-war thought and post-war thought, between socialism and Lutheranism, between the Old World and the New. See his autobiographical section in The Interpretation of History. Tillich considers himself, moreover, on the boundary between philosophy and religious experience. The task of the theologian, he asserts, is to mediate between the conceptual world of philosophy and the experiential world of religion. Theology he defines as theonomous metaphysics.

³Rv 12. "But when he wanted to arrive at theological formulation, he in turn needed someone who came from beyond the

worked out all the battle lines for the Hebrew world.

It is the dynamic Protestant-Hebrew, on-the-boundary situation which gives rise to true prophetic critique. The prophet is gripped by and grasps the demands of the Transcendent for his particular time. In his interpretation of the Will of God, the prophet must of course resort to the forms of rational criticism, which provides the critical vocabulary. Tillich's distinction between rational and prophetic criticism, therefore, must not be taken as a denial of a relationship. Indeed at their best the two interpenetrate each other entirely; in rational criticism, the prophetic becomes concrete, while in prophetic criticism the rational gains depth and power.¹

frontiers of either confession, from humanism, out of Christian humanism, of course, which meant no radical frontier. He needed melanchthon."

¹As a clarification it may be pointed out that what passes for prophecy is not always true prophecy. In an autonomous or secularized society like our own, the prophet is often confused either with the visionary Utopian or the mere publicist, that is to say, the political critic or astute observer who, however penetrating in his analysis, is blinded like his fellows, for without an awareness of the Transcendent he is only the voice of man and not the voice of the living God. Around Jeremiah there were not lacking those who were wise in the strategy of political alliances and the intrigue of the courts, but they were only shrewd observers of the policy of kings, not prophets of the Lord, for prophets put their trust in God.

4. Myth and Revelation.

Tillich tends to equate faith and the prophetic mood, which he characterizes as reliance upon the ultimate meaningfulness of the historical process. With religion defined as faith in the Transcendent, Tillich holds it a contradiction to speak of religion within reason or within humanity, for God is above and below and beyond all our thinking and striving. A man must therefore believe in order to know. Outside of an act of faith the Ultimate is not to be apprehended by philosopher¹ or theologian.

Tillich's act of faith, like all true belief,² is prompted by Revelation, which in Tillich's system sustains a close relationship with myth. According to Tillich, the myth develops out of a people's experience of the Transcendent in its manifestations in the world of men and nature and becomes hence the bearer of highest truth and a means of conveying Revelation. Imperfect though the myth may be, it communicates and discloses what defies explicit exposition. Plato knew its strength and carrying power and cast his sublimest insights in the forms of myth, and similarly Jesus with his parables. It is because of this high appraisal of myth as a vehicle of sublime truth that Tillich values the Bible in which are disclosed, generally in mythical language, representations of the sensibility of men, in specific historical situation, to realities which lie too deep for rational exposition. Garbed in cloaks of many colors that all may see, myths are expressions of the great

¹Rechof 28.

²Tillich distinguishes between belief which is only a Für-wahr-Halten and true faith which is arrived at in one's extremity: Trustfulness.

soul-shaking experiences of religious men and nations.¹

These experiences of being gripped by eternal verities as recorded in myth constitute one phase of Revelation, for Revelation is the self-disclosure of the Unconditioned Transcendent in history, the manifestation of the Eternal in time. In Christendom the revealing myth is the Incarnation and the Crucifixion. Christ² and Revelation are in our culture one. All subsequent revelations are only reverberations of the original,³ while all previous revelations are rendered luminous by it. He acknowledges⁴ in a somewhat romantic vein that Revelation can indeed appear in the splendor and death of flowers, in the creative strength and despair of a work of art.⁵ It is the mana and tabu quality of certain forms that make them likely bearers of transcendent import,⁶ as iron uprights are the most usual grounders of electricity, but for all the subsequent and previous manifestations, the primary Revelation is Christ and the Cross; they give significance to the rest. Christ is the Light that lighteth all the world. The Cross is the Center of history.⁷

¹Related to myths are metaphysical systems. Tillich welcomes their spread today as the sign of a general awakening to the inadequacy of rationalism alone to convey the highest truth. Indeed Tillich regards metaphysics, unlike Comte, as characteristic of an advanced stage of understanding - the myth-making of an age that has sensed the limitations of discursive exposition.

²Christ is both the historical Christ and the Christ experience.

³Of 411.

⁴R1. He has in mind here the creative yet sich selbste auflösende aspect of Revelation.

⁵He especially notes this in Expressionism. ⁶Of 407.

⁷Which is thereby revealed as salvatory history. We deal with the salvatory aspect of Revelation in the section on salvation from sin.

Christ on the Cross is the powerful symbol he is precisely because as God Incarnate he denies Himself. The self-immolation of the Lord is the denial of the Transcendent of the very form with which it invested itself, for the Unconditioned¹ cannot be encased in any form. It can only avail itself of a form which points beyond itself. While the Transcendent drapes itself in the things of the conditioned world, preeminently in the man Christ Jesus, it does so in such a way as to deny the very vehicle of which it has made use, for Christ went willingly to the Cross. Thus according to Tillich, Revelation does not lie in the ethic of Jesus, his prophecy, his inner life, and his numinous power, but rather in the mytho-theological fact of Incarnation, the paradox of the Cross, that is to say the spectacle of God suffering in human form. Convinced therefore of the actual anguish of the Transcendent in the conditionedness of man, Tillich is ready to acknowledge the tremendous significance of the patristic problem of the two natures of Christ and the Trinitarian controversy of the early Fathers, for theirs was a long but victorious struggle against the absolutization² of their God. Summing up the Christology of the patristic period, Tillich says that Jewish theocracy with its jealously exclusive, farmless³, and folk-bound⁴ monotheism was unable to

¹The Unconditioned is Tillich's most frequent and characteristic negative designation of God the Transcendent and Eternal.

²"Demonization" is the expression Tillich uses. It will be presently defined.

³Däm 29. "Wird die Besonderung aufrechterhalten, cvie etwa im jüdischen Ritualismus, so verliert der Gott das innere Recht zur Unbedingtheit und Exklusivität. Wird die Besonderung abgestoszen, so geht die Gegenivärtigkeit und Konkrettheit des Göttlichen verloren. Er entschwindet in einer innahbaren Transzendenz, die das religiöse Bewusstsein entleert."

⁴Folk-bound despite the Covenental Principle which made Jehovah independent of the people whom He happened to select in contrast to the relation that obtained between the God or gods of other peoples and these peoples.

become a universal, salvatory religion for the demon-ridden Hellenistic world without taking from polytheism the symbol of the Divine Mediator, who as finite and conditioned nevertheless became the vehicle of the Transcendent¹ and overcame the world. Through the vigilance and almost instinctive perspicacity of its theological guardians this new myth-religion was able to avoid the orgiastic excesses of the mysteries and the philosophical sterilities of the schools, and thus a theocracy, a religion of the Law, became a religion of Redemption, that is to say, saving grace.²

As the import of Revelation is the denial of all man-thought absolutes,³ the decisive Revelation occurred when culture and institutional religion had both become presumptuous. The thunderous No of the Crucifixion came at a time when culture in the form of the Empire and religion in the form of legalistic Judaism were asserting absolute claims. It is moreover significant that the revelatory Yes-No of the Incarnation and Cross was first sounded on the periphery of the Empire and on the boundary of Judaism. The Cross furthermore continuously levels a thunderous No against even the religion which bears it as a symbol,

¹In the static humanist philosophies, the Logos.

²This new myth-religion, however, was "in no way a result of the theoretical desire somehow to combine the Gospel with Greek philosophy (Däm 30.)."

³The doctrine of the Trinity can of course itself become demonized through calcification.

Rechtf 31. "Protestantism must learn anew to understand. Deus relevatus against the background of the Deus absconditus. That is the old and the new Trinitarian problem. And it must learn again to speak of Christ in such a manner that the powerful tone of basic Revelation in all religions and culture will resound in the background. That does not make Christ less, but it emancipates him from an isolation in which he did not stand in the New Testament and in the ancient Church. Through the Logos concept he was bound together with all of nature and history. (Rechtf 31)."

that is against Christianity itself whenever it tends towards religious presumption.¹ Revelation resounds a divine negation over both religion and culture. But its imperative Yes also reverberates over all Creation and assures meaningfulness to all who believe.

From the foregoing it is clear that Revelation is not simply discovery. Man does not search out God and find Him; God overwhelms man. He sweeps him from his base. There remains no vantage point from which he might survey the scene unmoved. He must decide for God or decline into nonentity. Once Revelation strikes, once the post reality of the Cross has become a present soul-stirring experience, the believer is henceforth possessed. Moreover, once gripped the believer is in no danger of an intellectual misconstruction of Christianity.² Revelation is always a direct hit. Whether he will or no, the man of unclean lips must speak to a people of unclean lips.

¹As the import of Revelation is a Transcendent No coupled paradoxically with a Transcendent Yes, Revelation is manifest at those critical junctures in history when the Transcendent by using old forms can deny and affirm at the same time. See the article "Natural and Revealed Religion" in Christendom, Vol. I, no. 1. Tillich shows that without centuries of Catholic penitential practice Luther would never have understood the Revelation of justification by faith. Without centuries of the Law in his system, Paul would not have been able to proclaim salvation by faith in Christ's full and sufficient sacrifice. Rechhof 20.

²Nor will complacent talk about Revelation in alien culture religions seem anything but palpably irrelevant for the believer who stands in a tradition. A westerner can only stand in the tradition of the West. That is his fate (Of 408). The Revelation and the Center of history for another tradition is of course different in its manifestation, though it is the Unconditioned Transcendent that manifests itself. The Center of history for the Jews is, for instance, God's leading them from the Egyptian bondage. It was both a basic and a salvatory Revelation. It disclosed Yahweh's might and also His love and concern.

Nor is that which reveals itself something half-hidden and half-dark, something discerned only when one's eyes are accustomed to Orin religious light.¹ Rather is it a blinding light, brightening until it sears, an all-consuming fire. And yet for all its brilliance, that which discloses itself remains necessarily the Utterly Other to which from out our finiteness there is no access. For the Unconditioned manifest remains also the Unconditioned Hidden. It is the Eternal Paradox. For were it not for an inner correspondence in the soul of man, Revelation would be impossible. All profound Christians witness to this contradiction. Revelation comes from the outside and yet without sympathetic vibration, which implies something similar with man, however finite, the mighty harmony could never be communicated.

¹Of 407.

5. God the Eternal Transcendent Unconditioned.

We turn from Tillich's doctrine of Revelation to penetrate more deeply into the Hidden-Manifest God of Christian-Jewish theology. We have noted Tillich's stress upon faith and Revelation without which "God" is only a human construct, the static Supernatural or the static Ideal, neither of which is enduringly satisfying. To the grace-suffused believer, however, Revelation discloses a sustaining Reality which religious language knows as God the Father and God the Son. This is, however, a worshipful symbolism of which Tillich makes only sparing use. As a theologian mediating between philosophy and religious experience he has preferred to use abstract expressions like "the Eternal" and "the Transcendent". But it must be stressed that pale though these expressions are in contrast to the worshipful appellations, these too are none the less symbols. The great failing of theologians (and Idealist philosophers) is that they tend to absolutize their concepts and proceed to weave a monstrous theological or philosophical web. Tillich points out several fundamental errors which his abstract symbols try to avoid.¹ First of all Tillich does not wish to destroy the warm worshipful symbols. They have their place in the life of devotion.² These are the ontic or positive symbols. Here we are dealing, however, with the ontological symbols, the negative symbols. That is to say we are dealing with the expressions of a theonomous person in his reflective mood, of the believer who can say of God little more than neti neti, of the devout

¹Interp 222-4.

²One recalls his approval of Hebraic anthropomorphism as long as one recognizes that God is always more than the symbols.

Christian qui deum propter Deum relinquat. We have already noted in connection with prophecy that Tillich favors the designation "the Eternal".¹ God sustains time, makes incursions into time, and renders time potentially meaningful. God is also the Transcendent. God is not merely another reality beside or above things, for thus He would be merely a thing of higher rank, which in its turn would have to fall before the truly Transcendent, a fate that has befallen countless divine pretenders.² Rather there presses upon man from beyond all being that Reality which is at once the affirmation and the negation of all things. This Reality is not a being or a pure Being, it is not a substance, nor even the totality of being. Rather is it, to use a mystical expression, the Superbeing which is at once the Nothing and the Something. And even the Copulative obscures the fact that the Transcendent is only the source of being. In other words it is not, although it is the source of all meaningfulness, the ultimate, deepest, all-shattering and yet creative meaningfulness. God is also the Unconditioned. Being the Sustainer of all and the Conditioner of all, He is Himself the Unconditioned and the Inexhaustible. All pantheistic or monistic attempts to identify God with the world, or religion with culture, forfeit the Abyss and

¹The Eschaton is the Eternal under the aspect of the goal of history. While it is thus not interchangeable with "the Eternal" or "the Transcendent", being as a matter of fact the abstract symbol for the Kingdom and the Last Judgment, nevertheless it designates the same ultimately undifferentiated Superbeing for which "the Transcendent" and "the Eternal" are the more usual expressions. The Proton is the Eternal under the aspect of the genesis of history. In mytho-theological language it is known as the Creation.

²Dām 25.

thereby render the Basis¹ of meaning shallow. By losing sight of the inexhaustibility of God these systems rob Creation of its terror, momentousness, and depth.

¹The Idealist and Value Theologians had only the ultimate, the norm, the form, which finally proved unsatisfying. Tillich, drawing upon Schelling, is able to give this new dimension to God and values. Tillich's God is a moral God because He repeatedly thunders No at the presumptions of man. As we shall presently see, the basis of all sin in Tillich's system is presumption. Thus God is a righteous God, a prophet's God, for He condemns in His wrath all presumptions.

6. The Divine and the Demonic.

Deep in the nature of God, the Eternal Transcendent Unconditioned, are two elements held together in dialectical tension: the Ground of being and meaningfulness and the Abyss of being and meaningfulness. Without the Ground the forms of the world are devoured and become nothing. Without the Abyss they harden or shrivel and hence also become nothing. And since God is in dialectical tension the two aspects of His nature are in continuous flux. Sometimes the Ground conquers the Abyss. Sometimes the Abyss overwhelms the Ground. All this movement within God is visible only insofar as it manifests itself in the world of man and nature. And the descriptive words I am about to introduce to describe this manifestation are thus not symbols of God, like the expressions we have been considering, but are symbols of God's manifestation in the world of nature and man. When in God the Abyss preponderates, then in the configurations in the world and history, which He at once shatters and sustains, we glimpse the Demonic at work. This is Tillich's descriptive symbol for the manifestation of God's destructive-creative wrath. The Demonic is sometimes fiendishly destructive; sometimes righteously indignant, expressive of God's resentment against the presumptions of man or nature, in which case it destroys in order to create. The Demonic is not identical with the Satanic which is the purely destructive principle. The Satanic is only a conceptual and not an ontological reality, for to be really destructive the Satanic would have to take some form, that is, it would have to become sufficiently creative to bear its own weight.¹ The Demonic is that principle in Creation

¹When the Satanic is thought of as ontological then one falls into manichaeism. Tillich tends to eliminate the concept altogether. Däm 11.

For the relation of these terms see chart on p. 34.

which tends towards onesidedness and hence ultimately to destruction, for the Abyss finally devours a form or so distends it that it disappears.¹ Tillich sees the Demonic everywhere at work. It is that principle which drove the Irish elk to extinction through impediment entailed in the growing, cumbersome immensity of its originally protective antlers. It is the same principle at work impelling a flourishing civilization to raise up slave-destroying pyramids and unwittingly thereby to fashion the tombstones to its former greatness. The Demonic is that force which drove England to fashion an Empire on industry, in the interests of which she absorbed her rural population in the sterilizing cities, only to use it up and biologically to cut off the only sound basis for an enduring expansion. The Demonic is that spirit which turns the hero into a tyrant, that overreaching which drives the genius to insanity. The Demonic is an upthrust from the Unconditioned that by reason of the preponderance of the Abyss within it, destroys forms and even the distorted forms in which it itself must appear. The Demonic is the Wrath of God. Obviously wrath can sometimes be cleansing, sometimes fiendish and uncontrolled. When the Wrath represents righteous indignation, then it is appropriate to speak of prophetic grace. When the Wrath is purely destructive the form in which it appears is known as a Demonry. A Demonry contains within it the forces of its own destruction. God's Wrath in other words is immanent. In proportion as Demonry² increases

¹That is to say, when a thing tries to achieve within itself the inexhaustibility of the Abyss it distends itself like Aesop's proud frog and bursts. This insight into the fact that pride (sin) is followed by wrath and its own destruction is fundamental, as we shall see, in Tillich's understanding of sin, guilt, and punishment.

²Capitalism, nationalism, intellectualism, and aestheticism are the principal Demonries of the present time.

the destructive side of the tension which constitutes the Demonic principle, the Demonry hastens to its end.

Corresponding to the Demonry is the Form of grace.¹

It is the form in which a second principle of God's nature, the Divine, manifests itself in the world and man. As the Demonic is the descriptive symbol of the manifestation in the world of the inundation of the Ground by the Abyss, so the Divine represents the opposite configuration within God's nature. In religious language the Divine may be known as Love or in a more intense form, Grace. While both the Demonic and the Divine have their source in God, the second principle appropriates the godly name by virtue of the preponderance within it of the urge to form.² Like the Demonic the Divine exists as a dialectical tension between the Ground and Abyss, but in such a way as to affirm form.

The Divine and the Demonic are so close that the one often changes over into the other,³ just as a flame can suddenly become a plume of smoke. In the flame the carbon particles scintillate with heat and radiate light, while the same particles in the smoke, if it is swept towards one's eyes, give tears instead of light. In this comparison the flame is likened to the Divine which gives illumination, warmth, and power. And as in the case of smoke and flame, so with the Demonic and the Divine, the forms

¹The Church, the proletarian movement, agape, forgiveness, and mystical intuition are widely divergent examples of bearers of the Forms of grace. "Sie ist nicht Seinsgestalt, sondern Erscheinen des Seins-Jenseik in einer Seinsgestalt (Rv 50)".


²Däm 11. "Seinsgestalt und Seinsunerochöpflichkeit gehören zusammen. Ihre Einheit als Wesenstiefe schlechtm ist das Göttliche, ihr Auseinander in der Existenz, das relativ selbestständige Hervorbrechen des 'Abgrundes' in den Dingen, ist das Dämonische."

³See chart on page 34.

are much alike. In history and religion the one is often confused with the other. It is a keen eye that can always distinguish the Demonry from the Form of grace. Eros is confused with agape, prophecy with false prophecy, hypocrisy and piety, ecstasy with orgy, sectarianism with loyalty, religion with the church, pride with pride. This latter contrast is especially instructive. The fact that in common parlance pride can be both a virtue and a vice is alone indicative of the closeness of the Demonry and the Form of grace. The difficulty in distinguishing the two is moreover heightened by the fact that a Form of grace, as capitalism once was, can become a Demonry, as it now is.

The problem of the relationship of the Demonry to the Form of grace, of sin to salvation is the burden of the second part of this study to which we now turn.

To show the relationship among these several conceptions I hazard to present the following scheme. The traditional theological designations of the different aspects of the Absolute are indicated in parentheses.



PART II

SIN IN TILlich'S THEOLOGY

A. TILlich'S UNDERSTANDING OF SIN IN RELATION TO SALVATION IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION

PART II

SIN IN TILLICH'S THEOLOGY

A. Tillich's Understanding of Sin in Relation to Salvation in the History of Religion

7. The Attempt of Divine Dualism.

For an appreciation of Tillich's contribution to the analysis of the problems of sin it is perhaps best to sketch in the background of the theological discussion of this doctrine.

Sin is a theological concept that has been wrought out in the age-long effort to solve the problem of evil in God's works, while at the same time upholding God as the guardian of morality. Three great religio-historical solutions have been worked out.¹ First (not in point of time, but in respect to simplicity), there is divine dualism which holds that there are

¹In the following paragraphs I have used the general outline of N. P. Williams in The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin as a basis for classifying Tillich's religio-historical observations. I have justified this procedure on the ground that Tillich's principal discussion of sin and the Demonic, Das Dämonische, does not presume to be as inclusive as the present generalizations do, and secondly on the ground that his remarks on sin and salvation in Das Dämonische must be connected by way of a more inclusive systematization with his study of lapsarianism in his doctoral dissertation on Schelling, concerning which he has only a few sentences in Das Dämonische.

The words "monism" and "dualism" which are used in the following section only as related to sin and God. Dualism in this usage implies, as we have seen, two Gods with one responsible for evil. Monism implies one God and no real evil. Lapsarianism which we shall presently discuss is likewise monistic in respect to the Divine. It is on the other hand dualistic as regards the cause of evil, that is to say, according to lapsarianism, God created man good but with a free will capable of willing evil. The point is that the terms monism and dualism are not used here in their usual philosophical sense.

two Gods, one of whom is responsible for evil in the world, while the other is the God of light. Cosmic monism, the second principal type of explanation, simply denies the reality of evil. Lastly there is lapsarianism which tries to retain both the reality of sin and the goodness of God.

Divine dualism, the reduction of polytheism to its intellectually most acceptable form, received its vivid formulation in Zoroastrianism, although it has been advanced in many forms, notable among them being Manichaeism which via Augustine and later the Cathari has had some influence in Christendom. By allowing all the good gods of polytheism to coalesce into one God of Light and all the evil spirits into a God of Darkness, the world view of divine dualism is thus able to retain confidence in the goodness of God and explain evil by the postulation of an Anti-God. According to this conception evil is to be overcome by man's joining the forces of the God of Light in His struggle against the power of darkness. But "this religion would have divided the consciousness and would have therewith had to throw itself before the Demon, if the God of Light had not been looked upon as the ultimate victor and hence as the real God. The equivalence of the Divine and the Demonic is impossible. If it is maintained, then in truth the Demonic is victorious. But that of course is never implied by any real religion; the superiority of the Divine is preserved. But this superiority is not unconditioned power. And therefore dualism is not an overwhelming of the Demonic and cannot so be because its God of Light has itself some demonic traits. Light is not the symbol of the unconditioned meaningful, the perfect spiritual form and unity, but rather the symbol of a natural sphere of being which stands over against another natural sphere. But such a

God of Light leaves out the true clarity of God, that clarity that makes God unconditionally powerful over Himself and all being."¹ Thus it is that divine dualism fails to find a satisfying solution to the problem of evil and salvation from it.

¹Dam 26.

8. The Attempt of Cosmic Monism.

Cosmic monism represents a more complex understanding of good and evil than divine dualism. It appears in three principal forms, spiritual, transcendent-immanent, and immanent-materialistic. Spiritual monism denies the reality of the sensory world or at least ignores it as unimportant. By this assertion it retains the oneness of God in contrast to divine dualism and at the same time upholds His goodness by declaring evil an illusion or an error. Bearers of the spiritually monistic understanding of evil have been in the East the Hindus and Buddhists, by whom the sensory world has been drastically regarded as illusory. "Particularly impressive from this point of view appears the figure of the Hindu penitent, before whom the God-Demons tremble, because he drives to dissolution the world with which they are inseparably connected. The radical negation of all forms of being also removes the demonic basis of all being. Only Absolute Being, the Brahman-Atman, the Nirvana of Buddhism, is pure Divinity unentangled with the Demonic. It is clear that in such a conception, existence is perceived as essentially demonic. The Brahman world births are just as demonic for the Buddhist, as the Maya world for later Brahman speculation. That is shown very distinctly when these world-creative principles approach the penitent monk with the tempting purpose of leading him back from the path of renunciation. If the temptation is refused, that means a shattering of the demonic kingdom, that is to say the existing world."¹ In both Indian traditions sin and punishment, interestingly enough,² are almost identified. They are considered as two aspects of the same weight of the universe upon the world-weary soul, a burden imposed for wrong done in a previous life. Escape from

¹Dam 26-7. ²Also true in Tillich; see footnote p. 31.

this punishment, salvation from this sin, has in Hinduism only a negatively ethical motivation, for the via negativa implies only an abstention from evil, not however an active good. Buddhism provides a variation on the spiritually monistic theme by regarding desire for the illusory world and its accompaniment, spiritual sloth, as the fundamental sin, which can be overcome only by spiritual strenuousness.

In the Occident, bearers of the spiritually monistic understanding of evil have been the Neoplatonists and the Gnostics of various kinds, ~~from~~ ^{for} whom the sensory world was real enough to be regarded as the prison of the soul, but for whom, this imprisonment was like captivity in the dungeon of a dream. The rampant evils of the world were in the sight of these monists mere stages of nothingness to be overcome by the simple expedient of awakening from the oppressive dream with the aid of asceticism and spiritual concentration, that is, mysticism. "In Occidental mysticism, the original type of which is Neoplatonism, the demonic elements are exceptionally weakened. That is caused by the preceding profane-antidemonic¹ development of Greece. Here, unlike India, existence is not evaluated purely as decline. It is an overflow of the unconditioned Superbeing. Yet it has in it a demonic element, matter, the $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon$ ² that is more than a nothing. Even in Greek philosophy it always designated the place of resistance against creative forms and in Plotinus expresses the changing of light into darkness, of the Divine into the Anti-Divine. The necessity of asceticism, the striving to unite in ecstasy with the Superbeing, root in this demonic-material element which clings to existence. Ascetic mysticism knows an overcoming of Demonry; but only through overcoming existence."³

¹Autonomous. ²Cf. "das radikale Böse" of the philosophy of a later autonomy.

³Däm 27. Because mysticism is no less destructive of

The second form of monism¹ in respect to the problem of sin we have designated as transcendent-immanental. God is thought of as above the world but also concerned with and active in the world. There are two important religio-historical examples: The mysteries and the exclusive monotheism of the Jews which we shall discuss later in connection with laparianism to which it is the prelude. The mysteries grew up on the ground of sacramental religion in the demonized Hellenistic world. Salvation from death and other evil was sought through a ritual identification with a dying and rising God. "It is essential to his character that the God voluntarily turn the demonic destruction against himself and thereby overcome it. . . . The Demonic contradicts itself; the Divinity takes the demonic destruction upon itself. The Divine appears as an individual, but in such a way that this individual subjects himself to the Transcendent negation of every existence. The Divine is present as a concrete reality united with man and the creature; but his character as unconditioned remains untouched. His very suffering and death safeguard his divine character insofar as they deny the claim as an individual to be unconditioned even in the instance that he is the incarnation of God Himself. The anti-demonic force of these conceptions depends on how far the mediator God has overcome the Demonic in his character and also on how far there has been success in avoiding a cleavage of the Divine and therewith a relapse into the folk religions. A Mediator God, who is not the bearer of spiritual personality, but reveals arbitrary elements, is a Demon; furthermore a Mediator God, who has divine quality independent of God and not through

existence than the Demonries Themselves, Tillich, as we shall see later, regards mysticism as a technique sinful.

¹See footnote p. 36.

Him is a Demon."¹

Still a third form of monism in respect to the problem of evil is that which we have characterized as immanental-materialistic.² It has developed on the ground of Christian autonomy and is mentioned here only to fill out the scheme. God or the Absolute is understood to be suffused through the sensory world which is alone regarded as real in contrast to Eastern monism. According to immanental³ monism the oneness of God is retained as is also His goodness, for evil is interpreted as goodness in disguise. Bearers of the immanentially monistic understanding of sin are the Hegelians, for whom whatever is the best possible at the present stage of the dialectical unfoldment of the Absolute, and also the evolutionary progressivists, for whom evil is merely ancient good made now uncouth. Immanental monism becomes completely moralistic and later frankly materialistic in the concluding stages of autonomous thinking, so that there is no longer the problem of sin and salvation. They are replaced by the moralistic concepts of wrong and right and still later by the pragmatic concepts of bad and good. And that wrong is the wrong of a complacent, bourgeois, technically realistic society. And that bad is the bad either of an intrenching capitalist society like Nazism or the bad of a Communist Party.⁴

¹Däm 29-30.

²This is not Tillich's characterization. See Däm 31ff where it is called Entdämonisierung and Profanisierung. This is the so-called autonomous solution which fails because it loses the depths when it gets rid of the Demonic and succumbs eventually to new Demonries of which we shall come to speak. See #12

³Immanental monism is at first not materialistic. See Hegel and Marx.

⁴That is to say sin, which is a theological and absolute concept becomes completely relativized. Tillich's idea of sin, as we shall see, is paradoxically relative in the sense that it is conditioned by Kairos and the Transcendent. In other words Tillich's sin is based upon a relativism that banishes all relativism.

9. Lapsarianism.

It is worthy of remark that any study of monism in respect to sin discloses that while it sets out to preserve the goodness of God by denying God-created evil, it comes dangerously close to losing the God whom the system sought to save. But there is thirdly and lastly the profound answer of lapsarianism which is principally a development of the Jewish-Christian tradition. Its doctrine of the Fall achieves the safeguarding of God's goodness and righteousness by making man responsible for evil in the exercise of his free will, but in such a way as to attest to God's omnipotence more eloquently than would the mere absence of evil in a deterministic world, for a world without freedom would be a meaningless and therefore not a good world.¹ Lapsarianism is able to combine the gravity of sin that characterizes divine dualism with the oneness, omnipotence, and goodness of God that attaches to monism. Lapsarianism has broadly two principal forms, universal and personal lapsarianism, and also a mother form which may be regarded as transitional between transcendent-immanent monism and lapsarianism. I refer, of course, to Hebrew exclusive monotheism. "Here the form of personality die geistige Form is affirmed as divine. Everything that confronts it with destructive quality is denied. The entire holy sphere, which stands outside the perfect ethical-social idea, is questioned and, insofar as it appears independently, it is combatted as demonic. The multiplicity is not surpassed by an embracing One or a

¹Sein bekommt Sinn durch neues. Neues ist möglich nur durch Freiheit. Sein ohne Sinn ist Sinnlosigkeit, ist Sinnwidrigkeit. Aber Sinnwidrigkeit ist Sünde. Deswegen ist Sein ohne Freiheit sündhaft. These are the oft recurring words and this is the argument of Tillich.

negative Absolute as in Eastern and Western monism but is combatted and subjugated by one definite power, exclusively, however, not monarchically as in polytheism . The jealous God is the exclusive antidemonic one, who bears spiritual form and therefore is the true God. For the divinity of God is maintained only where the absoluteness and unity of meaning stand untouched over against all demonic isolation and cleavage. In the development of Jewish prophecy all the essential antidemonic battle positions are worked out. Jewish prophecy determines the antidemonic character of Christian-Occidental history of religion up to the present time. In this line of development the dualistic¹ element of ascetic mysticism is excluded. Being is a creation of God and as such undemonic. The opposition to meaning, destruction of form, grows from the will of the creature, not from a demonic-creative principle. It has originated through freedom, not through transcendent creation. The demonic creatures of the past linger on as subordinate attendant figures without divine quality or their own character of holiness. And yet this line of development also tends to a peculiar return of genuinely demonic motives. The exclusive God is the God of a special nation with special cultural character. Now insofar as He makes an exclusive claim He must oppose Himself as the God of one particular nation. If His particularity is maintained. . . . the God loses the inner right to absoluteness and exclusiveness. If the particularity is rejected, then the presence, the directness, and concreteness of the Divine are lost. He disappears in an unapproachable transcendence which severs the immediate relationship between man and God.²" Judaism has of course been somehow

¹"Dualistic" is used in this quotation in its philosophical sense. See footnote p. 36.

able to avoid both the extreme of particularization and demonization and the extreme of universalism and emptiness. It has not, however, been able to become at the same time universal and concrete. That has been the achievement of Christianity.

Before turning, however, to Christian lapsarianism and Redemption as the explanation of evil and salvation, let us consider a moment the explanation that the Jews themselves put forward to account for evil. Thus far we have discussed Jewish exclusive monotheism only in terms of the history of religion. In late pre-Christian Judaism there were three explanations of evil in the Creation which God had called good.¹ Among the people two Fall stories prevailed. One was based on Adam's temptation in Paradise. The other was based on the Watcher story of Genesis vi. Neither was worked out into full-fledged universal lapsarianism, largely, because these two stories were competing with each other in the popular mind and did not enjoy the benefit of rabbinical sanction and elaboration. Eventually the Adam story completely replaced the Watcher story and became thus the principle explanation of sin for Christianity, growing as it did out of popular Judaism. While the rabbis were familiar with the two Fall stories they discounted them as popular fantasy, developing in their place an individualistic explanation of sin on the basis of the evil imagination which God places in the heart of every child whom He shapes in the womb. The evil imagination is usually thought of as a morally neutral but exceedingly active imagination which suggests and tempts. "Lead us not from the evil one" in the Lord's Prayer is an echo of this conception. God places the evil imagination in man to strengthen his soul, for it can be overcome by spiritual strenuousness. Some rabbis

¹The remainder of the paragraph is based upon N. P. William's Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin.

however, regarded the evil imagination as actually sinister and thereby they came dangerously close either to making Yahweh directly responsible for wickedness or to recognizing tacitly a minor Anti-God or demon in God's creation.

It will be noted that the rabbinical theory of the evil imagination has something in common with Jewish-Austrian Tiefenpsychologie. It is thus quite modern and instructive. It is, however, the popular myth of the Fall of Adam which the rabbis spurned that engages our attention, because it goes beyond a psychological description and attempts a metaphysical explanation. Universal lapsarianism, using the Adam myth as a façade, holds that all mankind participated in a superhistorical Fall. Of course the myth was not always consciously used as a façade. Had it not had the chthonic power of Urgeschichte it might never have been so effective, for pure allegorizing is debilitating. Personal lapsarianism, which makes use of the same Adam story, interpreting it as a prototype, holds that every man participates in a temporal Fall for which he is personally and directly responsible. Besides these two contrasting views of the Fall there have prevailed also several confused combinations. The confusion arises out of the fact that the principal Fall myth or façade, Adam's temptation in Paradise, has been exploited for both the historical-personal and the superhistorical-universal expositions.

According to lapsarianism the Fall is one stage in a great drama. God created the world and called it good. This is the important phrase ^{that} sets lapsarianism apart from spiritual monism. Man was made in God's image. Moreover his will was God's will, until man, through the exercise of his free will, turned from God despite warnings and fell from grace. But God in His mercy subsequently provided for salvation through the

Incarnation and the Cross. The fulfillment of salvation is envisaged in the coming of God's Kingdom which will restore the conditions of Paradise. Participation in this salvatory drama is achieved through faith in Christ's Atonement.

In both the personal and the universal lapsarian schemes the goodness of God is not only preserved by laying the responsibility for sin on man's misuse of his free will, it is even enhanced by the provision of a means of salvation which thus reveals in addition to the goodness of God also His mercy. In personal lapsarianism, both Jewish and Christian, salvation is thought to be provided by God through the Law, works, and sacraments including of course participation in the Eucharist. In universal lapsarianism, on the other hand, which is primarily Christian, full and sufficient Atonement for man's sin is believed to attach alone to Christ's sacrifice, so that salvation from sin can come only through faith in him.¹

As we pursue the development of the problem of sin and salvation in the Christian tradition it becomes apparent that corresponding roughly to the two interpretations of the Fall are two basic interpretations of sin. In the personal lapsarian scheme sin is thought of as the composite of committed sins, each of which might have been prevented, and for which a man is held responsible until he has done penance. In the universal lapsarian scheme sin is not so much the total effect of numerous sins as a condition of all men because man through Adam is universally fallen, so that even the goodness that men do is evil.

When personal sins preoccupy the attention of the

¹And lack of faith, that is, reliance upon works is even construed as sin, for example, by Luther.

Churchman, degrees of sinfulness are distinguished with mortal and venial sins, the two main divisions. In the universal lapsarian frame of mind, however, degrees of sinfulness are hardly recognized. There is also this difference: while the churchmen have pretty much agreed on what constitutes mortal and venial sins, the theologians are unable to point an unwavering finger at precisely that which is the essence of sin. In other words there prevails greater unanimity about what sins are than about what sin is. Indeed sin, as the condition of general apartness from God, has even within the universal lapsarian frame received a number of distinct interpretations, which we shall now consider, although there will be frequent reference to sins as distinguished from sin.

(1) We do not nowadays think of death as an evil in the sense of sin, but in the Hellenistic world it was primarily from death that man sought salvation.¹ In the demon-ridden, dying Hellenistic world already familiar with numerous mystery practices many early Christians found salvation, understood as escape from death, through a sacramental identification with Christ, the dying and rising God, who had by becoming man revealed that man could become divine, that is, immortal. Thus out of a world saturated with despair over the flesh as the prison of the soul, emerged the strenuous hope that man might be somehow delivered from the shackles of death. This yearning found fulfillment through faith in Christ's death and Resurrection. So firm was their faith that many early Christians sought martyrdom in Christ's name in order to overcome death with death.²

¹Note also that in the Fall story death figures as the principal punishment for Original Sin.

²Tillich himself regards Selbstheit as the fact of sin, as we shall see, and the dissolution of the individual will

(2) A second interpretation of sin resolves around pride and utter reliance upon the capacity of man apart from God. Pride has a prominent place both in personal and universal lapsarianism, but in personal lapsarianism it is merely one among seven deadly sins. In the Greek notion of hybris there is found the same overweening pride, although here the evil has its rise less in man than in the jealousy of the supreme powers who present the presumption of man and strike him down if he rises too high.¹ But there is lacking in both these conceptions the profound insight of universal lapsarianism that pride is evil not because it does harm to others or to the gods, but sheerly because it is vain and inadequate; without God's grace man cannot rise at all, lest it be in the pride that goeth before a fall. Pride is therefore often taken to be the fundamental sinful condition of fallen man because of his utter godlessness.

Sin as pride or self-satisfaction has been discussed theologically under the designation, concupiscence.² Within

therefore as salvation. To what extent the martyr's search for life through death can be interpreted in Tillich's sense is not developed. It is more than likely, as is evidenced on early tombstones and the like, that the bulk of the early Christians sought personal immortality.

¹Salvation from hybris is the middle way. Tillich would approve so long as the Golden mean were construed dynamically. Too easily, however, it flattens out into mediation or even shallow moderateness, with none of the element of decision so vital to Tillich's conception of salvation.

²In this concept sometimes desire for power (pride) is thought of as uppermost, sometimes the desire for sense (sex). Adam's temptation sometimes seen as directed to his sexual desire. The former explanation is favored for theological exposition, but the latter persists strongly because of its association with the transference of the Original Guilt, which in turn connects it with birth and baptism, which in turn relates it to the sacramental and ultimately the personal lapsarian scheme.

concupiscence medieval theologians distinguished three principal lusts, one or all of which might be active in fallen man even after baptism, which according to the traditional teaching removes only the guilt of Original Sin, not however the inherited propensity to sin.¹ The three libidos into which concupiscence is divided are the lust to power, the lust to knowledge, and the lust to sensation. All of these take their rise in man's sense of self-sufficiency and may be considered as aspects of man's pride.

We have noted how pride or concupiscence can be thought of as the fallen condition of man or as a sinful manifestation. In one case man is regarded as in sin. In the other case he is thought of as committing sins. It is appropriate that a few words be said about the corresponding notions of salvation. We have already mentioned salvation which was understood as salvation from death or the analogy of the mysteries. Another understanding of salvation has been that of the Christians who found escape from bondage to a pride²-ridden wicked world through agape, that is to say, through fellowship in the grace-suffused community of believers in Christ. Bound together by their common expectancy of the coming Kingdom³ and by the intense joy and increased power which was theirs through anticipated participation in the inevitable Reign of God, this body of the saved, this mystical Body of Christ became in time the Catholic Church, which was by Augustine actually construed as the Kingdom of God

¹Even after sanctification the inherited concupiscence is only subdued, never entirely excised.

²Understanding thereby all the evil manifestations of concupiscence.

³As the present discussion is only preparatory to Tillich's own conception of sin and salvation I can not go into the early Christian ideas of the Kingdom.

on earth, so that the Church came to sustain two overlapping interpretations: the Body of Christ and the Kingdom of God.¹ The relation between these two conceptions of the saved community, Pauline and Augustinian, was in principle the following: Christ, in whom the universal lapsarian finds by faith full and sufficient salvation from sin, was also the founder of the Eucharist and hence the Church itself, in which the fruits of salvation are communally enjoyed. When the Church as the Earthly Kingdom became in effect a culture-religion, embracing both nominal and faithful believers, mere inclusion in the parish became manifestly less than final/salvation. In the meantime there had naturally devolved upon the Earthly Kingdom the duty of providing for the defense of common morality, and salvation became in effect forgiveness for committed sins, against a looking toward a Last Judgment. That is to say, believers in Christ's full and sufficient sacrifice (universal lapsarians) came naturally to accept also on faith the requirements of Christ's Church (personal lapsarianism), with the consequence that the Church administering salvatory sacraments² became itself the mediator between sinful man and God. Thus it was that the sacraments by and large took the place of faith in Christ's full and sufficient sacrifice and sin came to be thought of in terms of individual sins.³ Besides salvation by faith and salvation by sacramental works there has been also another mode of salvation: mysticism

¹This was of course a development hastened by the failure of the Kingdom, as it was popularly understood, to be ushered in.

²Baptism, penance, the Holy Sacrament, extreme unction.

³Baptism which had been once the sacrament of adult salvation (universal lapsarianism and faith in Christ) become in time the infant initiation into the Christian cultural community. Baptism was thereupon interpreted as the prerequisite for subsequent sacraments of salvation.

with a long tradition. Weary or dissatisfied with the mediacy of sacramentalism and desirous of penetrating cultic forms to the Reality beyond or behind them, the mysteries have sought salvation from the incubus of the world weighing upon their souls by resort to mystical flights to the One.

(3) Still another center around which sin is often held to revolve is creature consciousness, which Rudolf Otto would call the ground of numinous sin. The Holiness of God is felt to be so utterly other that whatever man touches he defiles. Trespassing on holy precincts and violating holy imates are, especially in a primitive level of culture, regarded as heinous sin. Uzzah sinned and was struck dead when he touched the Ark, even when his intention was to prevent it from falling. Next above ritual sin in the numinous series is sin against the holy law, which in a sacramental society is often closely interwoven with the cultus. Violation of the Law, even when the demands of the Law were only indirectly ethical, constituted the principal conception of sin for the ancient Jews. Numinous sin in these two lower manifestations is one of the most widespread notions of sin both within and without the Jewish-Christian tradition. Within the latter, however, and especially within the universal lapsarian frame of mind, numinous sin deepens in its significance. For here even the saintly person senses his utter creatureliness. At a low temperature this soul-tormenting sense of creaturely sin overwhelms man through his failure to rise to the highest that is in him. It is not what others fail to see in him, it is what he alone senses before God. "Against Thee only have I sinned and done this evil in Thy sight." At a high temperature the sense of sin becomes the anguish of the man of unclean lips who has been called to speak God's word to a people of unclean lips.

Creaturely or numinous sin manifestly cannot be said to be peculiar to the universal lapsarian scheme, but in mood it is of closest kinship. Salvation from sin in this sense comes in the Christian tradition through faith in Christ's redeeming power. Expressed in the language of Otto it comes through being overwhelmed by the fascin^osum.

(4) Still another center around which theological discussion of sin within the universal lapsarian mood revolves is precisely the lack of faith in Christ's redeeming power, or more generally expressed, in the grace of God. If, according to this emphasis, God in His goodness and mercy has made possible salvation despite Man's Fall, the fundamental sin is man's lack of faith in God's full and sufficient grace made known to man through the sacrificial death of Christ. For Luther, the theologian of justification, this lack of faith constituted the core of sin. Without faith all man's works, even his good deeds, are in sin. Unbelief might be considered a phase of man's pride, his pride in his reason and his lust to know, but the prominence given by the Reformation to this particular kind of pride justifies its being set apart.

Indeed all of the conceptions of what constitutes sin overlap. It would be disconcerting if they did not. And even among the three broad divisions of the explanation of evil--divine dualism, spiritual, transcendent-immanent, and immanent-al-materialistic monism, and lapsarianism in both forms--there is considerable interpenetration and no little confusion and contradiction.¹

¹Not the least notable of which is double predestinarianism which, while starting out to preserve both God's goodness, omnipotence, and omniscience and man's responsibility for evil, ends up with a sort of monstrous monism which takes from the Fall its original significance. Rehtf 30.

Moreover in almost all theologians several conceptions of sin are combined and interrelated. Rarely are they worked out in a pure form. But in no theologian that I have read are more of the traditional elements of the doctrine of sin retained and explained than in Paul Tillich, who nevertheless remains within the universal lapsarian scheme and mood. It will prove instructive in the following sections to compare further his understanding of sin and salvation with the traditional background sketched in above.

B. TILlich'S DOCTRINE OF SIN

B. TILlich'S DOCTRINE OF SIN

1. Original Sin in Tillich.

Through affirmation of the universal sinfulness of man on account of free, yet fated participation in all kinds of Demonries, Tillich belongs clearly within the universal lapsarian tradition, although his understanding of sin is enriched by his grasp of the principles of both the divine dualist and the monist interpretations of sin. Yet as a universal lapsarian he pays little heed to the concern of the personal lapsarian, that is, he has little to say about one's personal misdeeds. In fact some readers of Tillich, like Erica Küpper, ask whether Tillich is really serious about sin when he unconcernedly leaves out of his writings the problems of personal sin. The answer is, I think, that Tillich is tremendously interested in the problem of sin, but that he accepts the traditional thought concerning personal sin and therefore has not written about it in detail, while his grasp of social sin has led him to direct his attention to universal lapsarian speculation and to the metaphysical grounding of sin. Consequently the theology of sin bulks large in his writings while the practice of confession and penance receives slight treatment.¹

Tillich's universal lapsarian speculation is constructed to a large extent on Schelling who was an adherent of the doctrine of a metaphysical Fall. Following him, Tillich distinguishes the history to which dates and events belong, from superhistory

¹Of course it must be kept continuously in mind that Tillich has thus far made no systematic study of sin.

expressed in myth, to which belong the Creation, the Fall, and Redemption, all of which take place supertemporally, that is to say, they are abstractions beyond place and time (Mystik 122). Just as the chemist spatializes the relationship of positive and negative charges of electricity with the aid of atomic diagrams, so the theologian has found that by making use of space and time references he can symbolize or suggest and thus convey the complexity of the Christian experience of the relation between man and God. The profound life of the soul is thus represented as an historical drama, just as the electrical configurations of the atom are likened to the planetary system. It would, however, be a mistake in both cases to take the symbol for a fact. Yet precisely this mistake is made when the lapsarian drama is taken as a historical reality. Hence Tillich's insistence on its being understood as superhistory, that is to say, supertemporal and superspatial. Tillich's understanding of superhistory is not, however, fully represented without stressing the dynamic and the sociality of salvation which is implied in the Fall-Redemption myth, but not always so understood. For the Church Fathers whose thought was Hellenic rather than Hebraic, even when they were universal lapsarians, tended to render static the Fall-Redemption myth, so that while they understood all mankind to have fallen with Adam and to be potentially saved through Christ, they tended to conceive of the salvatory act of faith as personal, so that a believer might be saved apart from society. The Kingdom was likewise understood statically as the body of believers. But the Church Fathers whose thought was Hebraic grasped the time factor and the sociality of salvation, so that salvation like Sin was understood as historical, and the Kingdom became the supertemporal symbol of salvation just as the

not
time
analogy
mixed
metaphor
as

Fall was regarded by most lapsarians as the supertemporal symbol of man's becoming sinful. Tillich has seized upon the Hebraic understanding of the Fall-Redemption myth as the more satisfactory and interprets the Kingdom as the superhistorical symbol of a theonomous Church-culture. Thus Tillich understands the Fall-Redemption myth dynamically and socially, with super-history and salvatory or true history crossing or meeting in the historical-superhistorical figure of Christ.

Let us turn to a detailed discussion of the Fall as a philosophical problem and then to a description of fallen man's actual condition. In the mytho-theological realm of Paradise man is symbolized by Adam. For "naturally the problem does not revolve around the individual human being, but rather around the unity of mankind, around the idea of man. For he is the subject of the Fall and not the individual as an individual (Mystik 114)!" Until his fateful decision to part from God's will in Paradise Man's selfness and love were blessedly united in complying with the universal will. But through the exercise of free will, which God in his omnipotence has bestowed, Man underwent a cleavage. His original Sin was that his will became particularized and that he himself became individualized. For Man, the conditioned, wilfully chose to turn from the Unconditioned which had always sustained him. This possibility of turning from God was of course one with his existence as something free, though conditioned. In order to be Man he was fated to be an individual. And being a free individual he was fated sooner or later to make a choice that would estrange him from God. His selfness was fated, otherwise being would have remained concealed within Unconditionedness. "And there would never have been any individualization, nor indeed any world. For the world itself is

an expression of the openedness of the Unconditioned. Hidden, it is an expression of the capacity of Creaturehood to repose within itself (Of 410)" But of all creatures Man alone has been able to separate himself openly from the universal will. "Only in him has selfness found itself and won the power to decide either for or against the principle of Love. In him the everlasting contradiction inherent in being has risen as spirit and subjugated love and brought forth selfness, time, and death. This rise of selfness is, however, alone man's work; it has not come over him like an alien power, for selfness is after all the necessary basis of his nature, but of which only the temptation to sin stems, not sin itself. Sin is the deed of the spirit (Mystik 114)." Schelling understood this profoundly, says Tillich, for Schelling raised Fichte's principle of the self-establishment of the ego to the fundamental principle of the Fall. Schelling meant thereby the individual ego, but Tillich adds that "this self-establishment of the individual as such is the essence of sin; the individual ego is simply, as an individual, a creation of sin, something of and for itself guilty. The eternally contradictory consciousness of man that he must be what he is and yet that he is guilty for being what he is justifies the doctrine of the transcendental Fall (Mystik 114)." Again Tillich says about man in whom the two principles of selfness and love are paradoxically joined in harmony. "When he realizes himself as a single being, as an abstract subject, as an individual ego, that is, when he wishes to impede the eternal process of Divinity, he sins. Sin is the attempt of the individual to oppose the reabsorption of all that is particular into the unity of the absolute synthesis. Sin is selfness which desires to set itself up as selfness

(Mystik 114)." Selfness is fated, but it is to be deplored. When it is not, that is, when the eternal contradiction that has become conscious through spirit approves of selfness, then is there truly sin. That is, was the will of man that clove man from God is repeated in Tillich's booklet on the Demonic. "Sin comes to man out of a realm which lies beyond his freedom, although it turns on his freedom. And it is. . . . the creative will to be like God that leads to the Fall and not the simple overwhelming of man by way of concupiscence (Däm 19-20)." Traditional Christianity has long wavered between concupiscence with its accent on sense, and pride in its understanding of the Original Sin. Tillich, we see, decides in favor of pride, by stressing the selfness which is implied in pride as the main-spring of the Fall.

This urge to realize the fulness of God within the self is demonic. "That which is intended by the doctrine of Original Sin can never be really understood," says Tillich, "without the concept of the Demonic. The element of necessity which attaches to sin, the paradox that in this perverse act (*wesenswidrig*) responsibility and unavoidability are bound together, corresponds completely to the dialectic of the Demonic, which is characterized precisely thereby that it reaches at once into the depths of the prepersonal natural and the superpersonal social and yet nevertheless finds its realization in the center of personal being. Insight into the Demonic thus overcomes the merely moral conception of sin (Däm 20)," although of course the moral is not to be excluded from the idea of sin. Tillich wishes only to show that sin is primarily a religio-metaphysical problem. We take leave from Tillich's understanding of Original Sin by remarking that his stress on selfness as the crux of the Fall lays the foundation for a collectivist solution to the problem of salvation, for which his whole theology is notable.

11. Sin and the Demonic.

From the foregoing it is apparent that Sin or perversion (Wesenswidrigkeit) will be illustrated in Tillich's writings by examples that at least the pietist or personal lapsarian would never think of calling sinful. Obviously also Tillich's concept of the Demonry is the basic category in his analysis of sin. The relationship between the two must be defined. Sin or perversion (Wesenswidrigkeit) is the more inclusive term "Sin does not always appear in demonic form. There are only certain manifestations in which sin becomes actually a Demonry. Normally sin remains within the limits of uncreative weakness. That does not alter, however, its sinful character.

Sin is perverse contrariness whether it appears in weakness or ecstatic strength demonically (Däm 19)." A Demonry is destructive-creative "Where destruction without creative form makes its appearance, it is appropriate to speak of incompleteness, error, decline, and the like, but not of Demonry (Däm 9)." Besides the creative-destructive Demonries and simple degeneration, Tillich also recognizes under the concept sin, the Satanic. But the Satanic is purely destructive. It can never exist in a form, otherwise it would be partly creative. The Satanic is thus only a conceptual term for the purely negative. Sin can never be purely destructive.¹

In discussing the manifestations of sin, both demonic and degenerative, we may systematize Tillich's far-flung descriptions and analyses with the help of a diagram which divides the Demonries from the less vigorous expression of sin along lines

¹Without the creative element sin would offer no temptation.

SIN: Degenerative and demonic; inadequate realization of meaning in time or complete failure to act.

The Authoritarian
Church

Communism

SOCIAL
INDIVIDUAL

WORLD-AFFIRMING
WORLD-DENYING

Indecision

Barthianism

Christian Science

Mysticism

HETERONOMOUS

AUTONOMOUS

Capitalism

Despair of meaning.

Technical realism

Unbelief

Utopianism

Lassitude

Nationalism

Nazism

Intellectual-
ism

Psychoanalysis

Aestheticism

Concupiscence

which Tillich himself has stressed. A first glance at the chart discloses that the Demonries are a mighty and variegated host. Despite all divergencies, however, the Demonries have this in common: They inadequately realize meaning in time or they actually exploit the potentialities provided by time, (history and personal life), to a perverse end. Just as dirt may be considered as matter out of place, so in Tillich's system sin in its most general characterization may be considered as action out of time or failure to act in time. Sin is misdeed because it is mistimed. Tillich thus carries his prophetic time-conscious thinking even into the doctrine of sin. Sin is the failure to see the transcendent in time, whereas the space-minded sacramentalist tends to interpret sin as trespassing, and whereas the space-minded mystic like the Hindu understands sin as any deed that binds him to the illusory world, the time-conscious prophet tends to see sin as failure to respond to God and his Providence.¹ When we discuss the Demonries in detail the time element in sin will become clear.

A second glance at the chart shows that sin is divided according as it is world-affirming or world-denying. Much of the sin which Tillich distinguishes is characterized by other-worldliness or despair of the worthwhileness of the world. Some religions are demonic and hence sinful because in the name of a Supernatural they presume to wield authority over men in this life. Mysticism is sinful because it is socially irresponsible. Unbelief is sinful because it despairs of meaning when meaningfulness is everywhere appreciable through faith.

Demonries can moreover be divided according as they are

¹Luther, for instance, regards doubt as the sin because it is failure to respond to God's provision of the Atonement and Redemption.

primarily social or psychic. Social Demonries are historical configurations. Psychic Demonries are no less historical in their significance, but their center is the personal life and their ground the unconscious. In both kinds of Demonries the Erotic and power drives are basic. "The dual relationship of the Demonic to the conscious and unconscious, to the spiritual and the subspiritual, to the human and the animal, to form and chaos, becomes perhaps clearest, when we turn from personality to society, from the psychic to the social Demonry. . . . It is not, however, the upthrust of the will to power or the sex urge which constitutes the Demonry, but rather their ecstatic, spirit-supported, spirit-forcing and yet spirit-destroying outbreak. . . . The social Demonry works out like all Demonries in a spiritual, meaningful form. The simple lack of form, the weakness of a social construct is, of course, not demonic (Däml6-7)." I cite this passage not only to justify my division of sin into social and psychic, but also to make clear that Tillich does not hold all sin to be demonic.

Another glance at the chart discloses still a third division, the most important of all, perhaps, namely, that which separates autonomy from heteronomy. In discussing the relation between those two major divisions of sinfulness we enter in detail upon the manifestations of sin. Interestingly autonomy itself has been one of the historical efforts, several times repeated, to overcome the Demonry of heteronomy.¹

¹Cf. # 8, p. 39.

12. The Struggle of Autonomy Against Heteronomy.

In the discussion¹ of the religio-historical efforts to account for evil and overcome the Demonic brief mention was made of autonomy as a form of combatting the Demonic and especially that particular concentration of the Demonic in the sacral Demonry known as heteronomy. In Western civilization the autonomy of the period of the Greek sophists and the autonomy and the modern period² are the most important. The cultural expression of autonomy is classicism or humanism which "is the attempt of man to set himself upon his own to find fulfillment of meaning in his own nature."³ At first humanism is religious, its aim is to destroy the demonic excesses of presumptuous sacramentalism, l'Infame. Humanism considers itself "a defense against the destructive incursion of the Beyond Being into being. Its religious background is precisely that of fighting the religious Demonry and trying to protect human nature as such."⁴ Thus it overcomes sacramentally defended excesses like slavery, the caste system, war and blood revenge, sacred prostitution, fanaticism, and dogma.

The great failure of autonomy is that in destroying the heteronomous Demonry it also loses contact with the deeps of being and becomes shallow, two-dimensional. Profanization or autonomy is a form of overcoming the Demonic, "but it overcomes it while at the same time tearing itself loose from the Divine.

¹See # 8, third section, "immanent-materialistic monism."

²From the Renaissance-Reformation to the present day.

³Rv 195. "Man is the measure of all things."

⁴Rv 196.

That is, of course, hardly the intention of the bearers of this development. Indeed they struggle against the Demonic for the purity of the Divine. Such was Greek philosophy against the Demonry of the Homeric gods. Such was the Enlightenment against the Demonries of the Christian confessions.¹ But the struggle takes place with weapons other than the inwardly religious. It takes place with the weapons of rational form. Originally there was felt no contradiction between Divinity and rational form, neither by Greek nor modern philosophy. On the contrary one wanted to glimpse and render visible the divine clarity in perfection, completeness, and rationality of form.² But with the divine clarity the divine depths were lost: the Inexhaustibility, the Upthrusting, the Unconditioned Transcendent. The Divine became the principle of a statically perfected or dynamically moved finitude reposing within itself."³ The fear of demons and ill-devising gods was banished by Epicurus. The Enlightenment banished Satan. But therewith thought also became two dimensional: form and matter. "The third dimension, above-below, divine-demonic, form-distending, grace-bestowing and destructive, is not perceived. The Negative is finitude, lack, sluggish-

¹"The bourgeois ideal and practice of humanity frees the personality and the community from the Demonries of sacramental origin. Mankind thus raises itself out of religious-inhuman and even subhuman practices. With this change, however, goes also the ideal of the Superhuman; lost is the sense of the impermanence of the merely human ideal, and lost is the sense of divine judgment over humanly perfected spiritual form. The ethos of humanitarianism, like its metaphysics, makes relationship with the Eternal itself a finite form. That means, however, its dissolution." (R1 100).

²Conquest of the Demonic is the development of Greek sculpture. . . . In the short climax of classicism complete liberation and perfect formation are reached simultaneously. The Demonic has disappeared; the Divine has remained. The Divine has received the character of clarity.

³Dam 31.

ness, but never active opposition, never contrapositive."¹

At least this rational attitude prevails until a "radical evil" is so often encountered that the humanist rationalist is finally forced to make room for it in his system. Thus Kant did, and before him Boehme who indeed raised contrariety to a cosmic principle.² This was also the conclusion of late Stoicism in its fate concept, Tyche. Thus autonomy finally becomes again aware of the reality of the Demonic. The whole Mediterranean world became finally demon-ridden until Christianity conquered. Today the whole of Western civilization stands upon the ground of a spiritually impoverished autonomy, that is to say, an autonomy which has come to its end, which cries for succor because it has lost its depth and direction. Thus has autonomy in its attack upon religious hybris become itself a secular hybris that now rideth to its fall.

¹Däm 32.

²Däm 24.

13.

In the development of Modern autonomy Protestantism has been the religious factor, humanism the cultural factor, and capitalism the economic. The three elements have intertwined and have mutually affected each other. In the development of each, three main stages can be distinguished. Protestantism passes from Reformation or Old Protestantism, to Protestant Orthodoxy or Scholasticism, to Modernism.¹ Humanism passes from Renaissance humanism, to the later humanism coupled with humanitarianism and consisting of three phases, to technical realism. Capitalism passes from mercantilism, to economic liberalism (manchesterism), to nationalism. The three stages of each strand in Modern autonomy do not correspond exactly, but there is obviously considerable correlation.

We shall consider first the development within Protestantism insofar as its changes have contributed to the shallowness of the autonomy in which we live. It is immediately striking to learn that Tillich is critical of Protestantism, for **after** all he considers his whole methodology as "Protestant".² Nevertheless he regards the Reformation as a Form of grace, for Old Protestantism was a prophetic onslaught against the presumptions of Catholicism. Protestantism thundered no against the whole Catholic sacramental system which presumed to be the custodion of God's grace, thereby replacing Christ as mediator between man and God.³ Protestantism declared that grace is not a substance that can be impounded in sacred acts and objects.

¹New developments and revivals have of course begun to appear since the War.

²Cf. # 3.

³Rechtf 20-1.

Nor can degrees of grace be distinguished, as the theologians had asserted. Grace is saving grace and it is available to the believer who has faith in the full and sufficient sacrifice of Christ. Protestantism was thus an upthrust of righteous indignation against the bondage to a hallowed sacramentalism. But it went altogether too far in its destruction of forms. Western Protestantism was particularly savage in its outburst. History is indeed strewn with the wreckage of the Puritan frenzy. Moreover Protestantism preached the priesthood of all believers and undermined the priestly office until finally the state, in the case of Lutheranism, and society, in the case of Calvinism, were able to have their interests represented from the pulpit in the name of God.¹ This is not, however, to deny the truly divine character of the Protestant outburst. It was prophetic and righteous. Protestantism, to be sure, displayed a demonic fury. It was a thunderous no, but it destroyed only to create. It is regrettable, however, that it went so far in its destruction of forms and the sacramental character of life, because in so doing it unwittingly laid the foundation for the emptiness of present day autonomy. Protestantism was easily assimilated to capitalism. Holy days were reduced, the wealth and service of the church were reduced, while religious individualism of Protestantism played into the hands of economic individualism. Nevertheless Tillich asserts emphatically "that originally Protestantism was the sharpest protest imaginable against the complacent spirit of finitude, both that of hierarchical ecclesiasticism and that of rationalism. Luther's protest was directed against both of these with powerful prophetic force in the name of the Divine which lies beyond all our doing. . . . The danger of Protestantism was that it would remain Protest only

¹R1 131.

without coming to some realization. On protest alone no church can be erected. Protestantism did, however, become a church,"¹ although in a weakened form.

Luther had insisted on the words, Christian experience and tradition, as norms. The Protestant churches, however, which grew up under the impact of his prophecy became quickly onesided. Some specialized on the Bible as alone authoritative. Others accorded authority to Luther's words. This was true of Protestant Orthodoxy or Scholasticism. Thus had the words of a prophet hardened into law, an oft-repeated religio-historical phenomenon. Against this formalism Pietism was a protest.³ And thus individual religious experience was set up as alone normative, with disastrous consequences for the unity of Protestantism. Modernism in all its forms is, in part, a result of this psychologism and individualism.

For historical reasons humanism and Protestantism worked together in defeating the medieval heteronomy. But they were by no means closely related in spirit. The differences between Melanchthon, the Protestant humanist and compromiser, and Luther are well-known and the famous words of Luther to the humanist reformer of Zurich are also significant: "Ihr habt einen anderen Geist als wir." The assumption underlying these remarks is, of course, that the truly prophetic critique came primarily in Luther. The rest of the Reformation was largely a settling down to a new "law".

¹R1 130.

²See discussion of Durchbruch and Realisierung in Rechtf 21. Also 2 Kai 28.

³Die mystik ist die grasze, religionsgeschichtliche entscheidende Kritik an der leeren theokratischen, autonomen und heteronomen Gestzlichkeit. Sie ist das starkste Symbol fur die Richtung auf den heiligen Gehalt und als salches der standige Hintergrund auch der Religion des Paradox (Rph 814)." But Pietism is without historical consciousness and therefore an unsatisfactory resolution.

About the contribution of Renaissance and Reformation humanism to modern autonomy, Tillich happens not to have written at length, although of course understood by him as basic to the whole Modern temper. He does, however, analyse eighteenth and nineteenth century humanism in which he distinguishes three phases.¹ Together they represent a reaction against the Protestant Orthodoxy of the seventeenth century and the Catholic retrenchment of the same period. Accordingly, what he calls revolutionary humanism is the cultural expression principally of the critics of the ancien regime. Classical humanism comes in Germany with Goethe; Romantic humanism is the last stage before complete profanization, of which Contism is a harbinger, sets in. Romantic humanism coincides with German Idealism which we have mentioned in connection with its static and rational limitations in respect to religious knowledge.² While autonomous culture in the form of humanism goes through its stages, the economic structure of autonomy is changing even more rapidly, so that "humanism becomes completely profane. Nor is this process merely accidental; it is founded in the very form of humanism. It is the dialectic of the indirectly religious attitude which works itself out in the development of humanism. It is eventually the failure of the attempt to draw the Beyond Being and Freedom upon that place where the interplay of conditioned being and freedom take place, the attempt to make human the Beyond Human. This attempt ends necessarily with profanization, that is to say, the exclusion and isolation of man from the Beyond."³ Humanism is finally mingled with economic liberalism. For a while it expresses itself in humanitarianism and Utopianism. But both of these are in a way sinful for they fail to recognize

¹Rv 197 ff.

²# 3.

³Rv 198.

the essentially destructive character of the system in which their proponents happen to occupy privileged positions. Tillich is especially critical of Utopianism which he characterizes as secularizing and rendering two-dimensional the Christian eschatology. Moreover, "Utopianism overlooks the reality of the Demonic as an element in historical creation. It assumes an entirely thisworldly, undemonized world. It knows nothing of the bond between mankind and nature and all being, all of which stand in ambiguity and perversion (Wesenswidrigkeit). Progressivism, which is revolutionary Utopianism domesticated, devaluates every moment of history for the sake of the ideal which reposes in Infinity, instead of in the Eternal. It fails to recognize the creative depths of every moment, its immediacy to the Eternal and its demand for decision,¹ whereby one is placed between Divinity and Demonry."² Utopianism and progressivism are thus guilty of a sinful failure to help enable the Eternal to realize itself in time.³ They sin because they do not grasp the dynamic of time, they are unaware of Kairos, and fail to draw meaning out of existence. They continually miss the opportunity of making for real change, that is to say, of creating meaning out of necessity. The last stage of humanism is coalescence with the spirit of capitalism, to become what Tillich calls technical realism, which we shall presently characterize.

The symbol of this completely profanized humanism is

¹"The decision before which every man is placed is a decision for meaningfulness as against the ultimate, however concealed, meaninglessness of existence (Rv 114)."

²Dam 22.

³And humanitarianism, like pietism, while doing individual good likewise overlooks the Gestaltende Krafte der Gegenwart.

capitalism at its present stage.¹ Although capitalism in conjunction with Protestantism once represented a Form of grace, bursting the shackles of feudal society, it has become in its old age a self-satisfied Demonry in some countries, and in others a savage one. "The Demonic is a power which is both holy and yet antdivine, sustaining and yet destructive. That is, however, especially true of the capitalist system. We all live from capitalism; it alone can support the great masses, it alone can span the earth and hold it together. And yet it is the destroyer of us all." For this "is the Demonry of the bourgeois spirit that it has created a system that forces, in an unending service to the finite and in a struggle of all against all, the utter sacrifice of body and soul."³ Nor can anyone escape guilty participation in the service of this monster. "The continuous references to well-meaning and kindly businessmen in contrast to greedy, resentful proletarians are apt and yet meaningless in respect to the whole situation. It is completely impossible in an all-inclusive system like capitalism to resort to the subjective in order to escape the Demonry. The Christian entrepreneur must, unless he wants to be whipped by economic collapse, carry on the class struggle from above. . . and the anti-Christian proletarian must as a class fighter raise from below the antidemonic, that is to say, Christian protest against the Capitalist system. The Christian situation frees no one from participation in the demonized system that bears the society to which he belongs. The intellectualized (and also mostly illusory) so-called position beyond the class situation is not real but rather an ideological beyond. Of all people

¹Tillich, as far as I know, does not go into the history of Capitalism.

the theologian should know this, who in abstracto so readily speaks of 'community under sin'.¹ Whether we will or no we are part of a community of fate. We are part and parcel of a community-destroying community.

As our autonomous society resting upon capitalism, finally succeeds in destroying much of the spiritual fabric that holds people together, humanism as we have seen hardens into technical realism,² also known as Americanism. Technical realism sees in things only their use value. Things were once filled with personality. We have only to think of the shoemaker of Tolstoi's short story or of the medieval craft practice of creating a masterpiece. Today capitalistic mass production is directed toward profit instead of use. Things have become mere wares. And the people who make them have become mere units of labor. Mass production leads to mass men. And so technical realism as an expression of late capitalism is guilty of becoming space-bound like the sacramentalism which capitalism-Protestantism once tried to replace, that is to say, meaning-emptied things have taken the place of the religious Demonry of holy acts and objects. The bondage of meaning-emptied men, the masses, to a meaning-emptied institution, capitalism, has become the monstrous Demonry of the Twentieth century. Indeed the unwitting annihilation of the sacramental character of life wrought by Protestantism, the profanization of life stimulated by humanism, and the destruction of community and community-mindedness by world capitalism represent a greater desolation than anything. Christendom has thus far had to overcome.

Moreover as Christianity sluggishly awakens to its role of community builder and sustainer for Western civilization, it

¹Rv 303.

²Rv 70.

finds that another force has been operative for some time to combat the evils of community disintegration, but in the name of the nation instead of civilization. Just as autonomy is broadly speaking an historical effort to defy the heteronomous Demonry, so within autonomy itself there has risen up nationalism to combat the principal Demonry of the day, namely, capitalism. Unfortunately, however, the good cause is immediately vitiated, for nationalism presumes to use the means of capitalism to wipe out the evils of capitalism. The principal evil of capitalism is, according to nationalism, the destruction of the community and the loss of national personality in the sterility of cosmopolitanism. Thus in the name of the people, though actually in the interests of one class, nationalism sets about to divide into hostile camps a world that has begun to be drawn together by world capitalism. In its ruthlessness nationalism succeeds not only in dividing the world but in dividing into embittered classes even the national group in whose common interest it presumes to act.

Tillich regards fascism as an especially vicious form of nationalism. And for its German form, he reserves his most savage criticism. Nazism is a most negative Demonry, because as the National Socialist Workers' Party it has inveigled the proletariat and lower middle class, which, as we know, Tillich regards as a Form of grace in our Kairos, into fighting, in the name of folk and community, the true proletarian-conditioned socialists who alone could have wrought an enduring national unity.¹ In other words Nazism is a demonized Form of grace² which makes it more fiendish and despicable than anything it

¹Soz 115.

²Made up of the class of people it was, it might have become truly socialist.

set out to oppose. Nazism in its justifiable distrust of rootless Cosmopolitanism has gone to an excess in its elevation of Germanhood to an absolute. In its defiance of the demands of Kairos in the present stage of Western civilization it discloses its demonically space-bound character. Its political sacramentalism and its space and soil theories attest to its failure to grasp the meaning of universal history for the present hour. Instead of moving forward, it moves back into its own imperial past. It is sinful because it absolutizes itself and is proud.

14. Concupiscence, Aestheticism, and Intellectualism.

In his discussion of the personal manifestations of sin in autonomous society, Tillich accepts the medieval division of concupiscence into the three libidos. They are assumed as basic to all his elaborations. It is however noteworthy that throughout his writings he pays scant attention to the sexual manifestation of the libido Sentiendi. The reason for the lack of attention to the problem of sex around which indeed many theologies of sin have revolved, is doubtless that Tillich regards the problem as intimately bound up with the general problem of autonomous Demonries, for within a godless, technically realistic society all values are shaken. He sums up the situation thus. Spiritually indifferent exploiters and a spiritually impoverished mass are the terrible disintegration products of autonomous society. From the fearful bondage to a world of things emptied of all transcendent import, from a world in which speed-up industry grinds and macerates the very nervous systems of men, from a world in which urbanization has gone far to destroy the basis of the family and traditional sex standards, a great many of both the classes and the masses have turned away, seeking relief in sensual pleasure, notably in sex. Concupiscence has thus spread through autonomous society almost as a mass phenomenon, as indeed it has in several periods of history on the eve of social catastrophe. Concupiscence in its sexual manifestation is demonic because it exploits a creative impulse to destructive ends. Eroticism is sinful because it is sustained by no transcendent eternal reference. Indeed marriage, contracted in an autonomous milieu without sacramental character, is often enough without a sense of the dynamic of time even when the partners

happen to live together faithfully throughout life. For "two individuals can be led toward a living unity only when joined by an unconditioned transcendent principal, that alone is above time and its change, namely the Eternal (Rl 89)."

An aspect of the libido sentiendi which occupies more of Tillich's attention than sex is aestheticism which he specifically discusses as one of the four principal Demonries of our autonomous civilization. Aestheticism is the Demonry of art for art's sake. It expresses itself in many ways. Tillich is, for instance, highly critical of the new liturgical forms which are seldom celebrative of the present day religious aspirations but rather are drawn out of the past to pique and please the aesthetic tastes of people who might otherwise find the attendance at worship tedious. Tillich is also especially critical of impressionism in art, especially in painting, where it irresponsibly delights in sheer surface phenomena, namely the dissection of light into its hues. Impressionism has no sense of the deeps, no sense of the dynamic, no awareness of the transcendent import in things as have the expressionists, or as had the medievalists who, for example, suggested the beyond or the transcendent by means of the aura about the heads of saints. Tillich's demand that art be an expression of the transcendent import of life, leads him to condemn many so-called religious pictures. These may have religious content, (Inhalt), he says, but no religious import (Gehalt). There is in the bulk of "religious" pictures no evident struggle to suggest the unconditioned which by its nature defies all form. Their subjects are only traditionally religious. Hence there may be more of the truly religious in a landscape by Cezanne than in a picture of Jesus by Uhde. Aestheticism is a Demonry because it falls

into mere form. It is an autonomous Demonry characteristic of individuals who have set themselves apart from society, using sometimes even esoteric symbolism, incomprehensible to the rank and file, who, however, have every right to participate in the artistic creations of society. Aestheticism thus cheats society. It is the Demonry of individuals who have shut off all avenues of communication except those of the senses and who are therefore entirely unaware of the Unconditioned which condemns them and all their works as godless and hence meaningless and sinful.

The libido sciendi expressing itself in autonomous society as rationalism or intellectualism accounts for another of the principal Demonries. Intellectualism is not to be thought of as a Demonry because it represents an overamount of intellect and reason but because it is a distortion of the whole of reality from the point of view of the rational subject.¹ When intellectualism becomes demonic, that is to say, onesided and exclusive of all other ways of knowing, it has two principal faults. It understands nature and tradition not as they point to the Eternal but merely as finite forms. We have discussed this fault under the Idealist position in religious knowledge.² Secondly intellectualism, in holding the Object of its quest to be static, fails to realize that the Unconditioned makes demands in time with which the intellectualist fails to comply. The intellectualist is in other words guilty of not acting as part of his historical community of fate and potential freedom. Intellectualism is therefore in autonomous Demonry whose evil lies in its exploitations of man's most characteristic faculty to a non-creative end.

A manifestation of intellectualism of which Tillich is

¹Dam 40.

² # 3.

particularly critical is psychoanalysis which makes the lustful process of intellectual curiosity into an instrument for probing into the soul with the intent of removing complexes and which thereby replaces the whole Christian idea of a transcendent forgiveness. While Tillich commends psychoanalysis for its penetration and discoveries, on which indeed he draws extensively, he condemns it for not penetrating far enough, in other words, for its too little faith (R1 90-1) (Moderne 124-5).

15. Dispair of Meaning, Unbelief, and Lassitude.

Intellectualism has moreover the fearful consequence of leading one to dispair of meaning. The man of the present¹ "is aware of human ambiguity. He is aware of the dislocation of his inner life, the contradictions in his conduct, the demonic possession of his personal and social existence. He knows moreover that with his existence also his knowledge is swept into the chaos and truthlessness, that is, the demonic distortion and hindrance of the truth, ... And often it happens that in this collapse of values and forms, content and meaning, he is driven to the very brink of the abyss of meaninglessness which threatens by its demonic and yet fascinating visage to engulf him."¹ In his discussion of the crisis of autonomous science, Tillich shows that our whole bourgeois civilization is shot through with dispair, with the sense of meaninglessness. On its intellectual side bourgeois society has been the world-historical attack upon original myths. It has led to the dissolution of man's connections with his origin. It has been the proclamation and the realization of self-satisfied thisworldliness.² We have already seen how humanism, the culture of unbelief-ful autonomy, and specifically Idealism stops at the synthesis of the world form and makes it directly identical with God.³ But ultimately intellectualism dispairs of its own construct. Life then loses meaning, history its sense of direction. This loss of meaning is one of the great manifestations of sin that corrupts the world today. It is reducible to a form of pride. "It dispairs of the world because it does not dispair of itself."⁴ It has not the spiritual dimension

¹Rv 37.²Soz 67.³Rph 805.⁴Rechtf 25.

that would make it aware of the incapacity of the intellect alone to prove what can only be believed.

Tillich reminds us that the present day loss of the sense of meaning and doubt are what Luther called the fundamental sin. For Luther unbelief is "identical with the will to seek out the unconditioned truth, to reason God, to experiment and experience, that is to say, it is the will to set up as absolute one's own starting point which stands outside the ground of meaning."¹ Reason only discovers God and then ~~dis~~spairs of its finding, say both Luther and Tillich. And this ~~dis~~pair or unbelief is sinful, for "according to theological tradition, the root of sin is distrust of God. In this definition, the religious character of sin is most sharply expressed. This definition also gives us the deepest insight into the nature of the Demonic. For distrust of God is demonization of God in human consciousness. Man does not dare surrender to the Unconditioned, because he sees the Unconditioned as that which judges him, destroys, breaks him. All religious history is filled with this demonization of the Divine. It appears most terribly where, with the elimination of all sacramental mediation, man is placed directly before God and experiences his absolute claim and His rejecting wrath; or where, with the disintegration of all life contents, the Unconditioned appears as the Abyss of nothingness. Here the Divine receives a purely demonic character Men, in experiencing this terrible view of God as a Demon, cannot retain any natural relationship to God. The divinity of God becomes the absolute paradox, which can never be expected and proved. Outside of grace, God is a law, a judgment which drives one to ~~dis~~pair. He becomes

¹Rechtf 25.

God--in contrast to the Demon--through grace. That is the deepest relation of sin and Demonry."¹

Related to doubt and despair in respect to the loss of meaning, but unlike them in its unconcern is spiritual lassitude which has even ceased to despair of meaning or possibly indeed has never been concerned with meaning. Spiritual lassitude, the attitude of don't care, the sin of sloth, has become almost a mass phenomenon in our autonomous civilization. It is sinful because it is individualistic to the point of social irresponsibility, unkairic, fleeing from the necessity of making decision, and therefore conducive to widespread meaninglessness.

¹Däm 20-1.

16. Heteronomous Demonries of the Present Day.

It is not surprising in view of the autonomous mood of our society that Tillich has comparatively little to say about present day heteronomous sin, but in the interests of completeness it is appropriate that we assemble some of his observations on this head before we turn to a discussion of the theological significance of these sinful manifestations.

Closely related to spiritual lassitude or sloth, which was touched upon as a degenerative example of autonomous sin, is indecision for or against the Demonries of the day. The attitude of indecision is grounded in the assumption that the world has no enduring significance. It fails to see purpose in history and discounts both the world's good and the world's evil. Both are to be ignored. The religious man should resist not evil. Man is on earth but a sojourner, he lives zwischen den Zeiten, his mind set upon the Supernatural. At first, Tillich approved of dialectical theology but he was later forced to withdraw his approval. "The radical understanding of the Unconditionedness of the Unconditioned," he writes, "the radical proclamation of the crisis in the sense of judgment also even against all religious and churchly realization seemed to shatter both Orthodox absolutism and Liberal Relativism. Demonization and profanization alike of the Evangelical message appeared exposed and uprooted. At the same time from this standpoint all attempts to set up political, spiritual, and social movements as the Kingdom of God were branded as human hybris."¹ Tillich thus felt himself drawn to march with Barthianism, for he understood its proclamation of the Transcendent as equivalent to his

¹Rv 20.

concept of the Unconditioned. He continues, however:

"Since the supernatural end stage of the dialectical movement in Barth's dogmatics became manifest, cooperation in this direction was made impossible for me. This turn of thought seems to me now the most painful and even the most ominous development in the more recent Protestant theology. . . . Moreover, less because of the theological reverberations than because of the effect upon the churches."¹ For Barthianism nurtures a non-participating attitude, even though the War and the ensuing problems have shown clearly the role that the Church could play. Barth's idea of decision is not Tillich's. The one is decision for the Supernatural zwischen den Zeiten. The other's is decision for the Eternal manifesting itself in time. Barthianism is thus deemed a heteronomous Demonry, because by refusing to decide against the Demonries of the day it actually decides for them and hence builds upon a demonized base. Its great failure, according to Tillich, is that it does not grasp that God is dynamic, impinging, as the Hebrew prophets well knew, upon the lives of men in history, and that God has a controversy with all his people, so that salvation cannot be alone personal as the Barthians maintain.²

Related to historical indecision in its static conception of the Transcendent is mysticism as a technique of salvation. Like Barthianism it is condemned by Tillich because it involves a flight from the world of responsibilities, refusing to participate in the necessary decisions of an onward-moving society. This escape-mysticism that relies on technique he distinguishes from mysticism as a means of knowledge.³

¹Rv 20-1. ²Barth is now changing since this criticism was leveled against him.

³In which case he regards it as a Form of grace.

"Mysticism is the attempt to recapture the last immediacy of religion, which must be the basis for very breaking through of objectivity. . . . Nevertheless this flight into mysticism remains always a cleaving to subjectivity and therefore to works even though in a negative form."¹ And works imply doubt, and doubt or mistrust, theological tradition has declared to be a sin.² "The majesty of God will not be reached, the ground of meaning will not be discovered, because one can always shove this mystical experience to one side. Truth which is not a consuming fire but merely a warming glow is not able to convince. . . . If truth is to reach the level of the Absolute, then it must assume the Form of grace, the form of Durchbruch."³ In distinguishing mysticism as a technique of salvation and mysticism as a Form of grace, that is to say, upward and downward or Godward and manward mysticism, Tillich points out that the modern mystics are inferior to the classical mystics in respect to earnestness. The classical mystics in respect to earnestness. The classical Christian mystics transcended cultus and sacrament, but they rarely defied them. Indeed classical mysticism was never a separate religious movement but rather an intensification or radicalization of the sacramental attitude in contrast to the prophetic. Both are directed toward the static presence of the Unconditioned, sacramentalism in given, concrete forms, mysticism beyond all forms."⁴ "the modern mystic on the other hand uses mysticism to the complete exclusion of positive religion. With this is bound up the aesthetic character of modern mysticism whereby it is distinguished in its very core from classical mysticism. . . . It lacks the high seriousness that always made the true mystic into an ascetic."⁵

¹Rechtf 23-4.

⁴Rph 812

²Cf # 15.

⁵Rl 109-10.

³Rechtf 24.

All this leads one to conclude that the modern mystic is suffused merely with self-complacency rather than with a strong desire to be gripped by the Eternal. Mysticism of this lower order, exemplified for instance in Christian Science, is always an intensification of human consciousness which is confused with the truly religious attitude. Self-repose in finitude becomes divided, falling into a lower and higher sphere, but it is not really broken through, for the higher realm remains nevertheless of this world, while in true mysticism the world in all degrees disappears before the Yonder of the Eternal.¹

Mysticism as a technique is thus condemned by Tillich as a Demonry, because it fails to remain open to the Unconditioned Eternal demanding decisions in time, because it is individualistic and socially irresponsible, and because it is presumptuous in that it assumes by works a man may rise to God.

Mysticism and Barthianism are primarily personal Demonries, the former by its very nature, the latter in respect to its influence. That is to say, the Barthians are not as yet numerous enough to have rendered the church actually demonic.

We turn now to the ecclesiastical Demonries of the present day, foremost of which is the Roman Catholic Church. It is demonic because it exerts worldly power by virtue of presuming to have a special spiritual authority based on apostolic tradition, priestly asceticism, sacred writings, and sacraments. Roman Catholicism, like all ecclesiastical heteronomies, asserts that the unconditioned meaning reveals itself in a "specifically religious sphere. The remaining forms are left to autonomous culture with the provision that it in turn recognize the religious symbols as unconditionally authoritative. Religious hybris stands thus over against cultural hybris."²

¹R1 114.

²Rph 801.

If the Church thus "claims absolute validity for the assumed forms in which it must live as earthly society, if it calls itself the Kingdom of God, then it succumbs to arrogance and violates culture and society. . . ."¹

As it is the holiness of sacramental acts and objects and forms and the associated understanding of grace that constitute a large part of the difference between Protestantism (insofar as it is not, it is not itself demonized) and Catholicism, it is appropriate that a few words be quoted from Tillich on this head: "According to Catholic interpretation, wherever the Beyond Being appears it changes the being, whether that be the humanity of Christ, the actual Church, or the elements of the sacraments. These tangible forms of being are in their tangibility at the same time transcendent. Their holiness does not do away with their tangibility. The Beyond Being appears as a being. In contrast thereto Tillich's "Form of grace" asserts that the Beyond Being appears in an a being In the forms of being it appears as their transcendent meaning. Between appearance in them and identity with them lies the Protestant protest, which will not recognize this Einswerden as valid, holding it to be a demonic hybris."² This is not to say that Tillich does not appreciate the warmth and social cohesion engendered by the sacramental system. He has indeed greatly modified the Lutheran conception of grace in keeping with his appreciation of sacramentalism. His objection is directed not against sacramentalism as long as it remains theonomous, but rather against a vergegenständlichung of grace

¹Interp 228. Its heteronomous excess is best symbolized in the figure of the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov who persecutes even the returned Christ in the interest of a stable hierarchy.

²Rv 50.

in objects and acts. The Unconditioned can never be encased in forms.

As to Roman Catholicism on its socio-political side, Tillich freely acknowledges that it ranges itself against the sterility of bourgeois autonomous civilization, but unfortunately it is itself a piece of self-containedness, a portion of the Middle Ages floating like an iceberg into the warmer waters of the autonomous centuries.¹ The Church regards itself as timeless. It has no sense of a dynamic God making demands in history. It is almost completely lacking in the prophetic sense. Still more unfortunately the Roman Church, in its effort to conserve, and to a lesser extent also other churches,² insofar as they deplore bourgeois autonomy, tend to tie up with heteronomous tendencies within culture in the belief that they can thereby support the attack on bourgeois godless complacency. By so doing, they become partners of politico-social reaction.³

We pass now to another heteronomous social Demonry, Bolshevism. Unlike ecclesiastical heteronomy it is world-affirming and dynamic, but like it Communism claims to have within itself the essential truth. Indeed Marxism has developed its own sacred scriptures, the words of Marx and the pronouncement of science. "Scientific concepts become in Bolshevism symbols which work heteronomously."⁴ Moreover Bolshevism seems

¹R1 121-7.

²An extreme example of ecclesiastical heteronomy that turns completely from the demands of the world, even to the point of denying the existence of its evils, in the Church of Christ, Scientist, which asserts that all religious truth and hence all essential truth is contained in the preserved writings of one woman.

³Moderne 175, 2. Teil.

⁴Soz 185.

unable to sustain a continuous critique of itself as well as against the society it opposes.¹ The truly prophetic spirit is critical not only of society but of itself. A man of unclean lips must speak to a nation of unclean lips. The Communist, however, does not feel thus humbled by the power whose instrumentality he is. Communism seems indeed to have succumbed to the autonomous Demonry of intellectualism. This tyranny of ideas is evidenced not only by the recent Soviet purges, which are a manifestation of an ideological conflict within Communism as it works out in practice, but also perhaps more devastatingly in the liquidation of the kulaks who were destroyed as representative of the "oppressive bourgeoisie" so that the Marxian idea of the struggle between the "proletariat" and the "middle class" would seem reasonable in a country which after all was far removed from the Marxian "revolutionary situation". For the sake of the Marxian idea the kulaks had to symbolize the bourgeoisie in default of a real one, while peasants in general and soldiers, along with relatively few city laborers, became the "proletariat".²

Besides the intellectualism of autonomous bourgeois society, Communism has also carried over bourgeois individualism in its bad sense. The ideal of the Communist society, once the spade work has been accomplished by a dictatorship of the

¹Tillich likens these false prophets of the proletariat to the false prophets of Israel who always supported the monarchy. Marx 27.

²In Nazi Germany where the binding idea is racial instead of economic a similar outrage is carried on in the interests of an idea. While there are several important elements in Nazi antisemitism, it cannot be overlooked that there is also this purely ideological necessity for antisemitism. If blood is to be the binding force while yet the racial purity of the country is all too obviously lacking, then at least one group must be singled out as a symbol of the fact that not all Germans can be truly German, so that being a German will have some cohesive significance. Thus are the Jews sacrificed to an idea.

proletariat, is complete individualism or idyllic anarchy, for Marxism envisages a dwindling state, once the means of production are in the hands of all. But in its interpretation of the state as a power instrument of one class, Marxism fails to make a distinction between force (Gewalt) and might or power (Macht). Might is power on the social level. It differs from force in that it derives from the consent of the social group. "When force becomes isolated from power, whose function it is, it soon dissolves, for force thrives on acquiescence to it, even on the part of those who are subjected by it."¹ Therefore as long as the classless society is desirous of the Communist order it will have power which will remain in effect embodied in the state. But by confusing force with power Bolshevism has justified its ruthless use of force in the presumed interests of a classless and stateless society, while all the time it has exercised force in the interests of a limited group.

Lastly Tillich criticizes Communism for having taken over the Godlessness of bourgeois technical realism. Tillich gladly acknowledges that the Communism of Marx was^a truly prophetic outburst against bourgeois self-complacency and that while Marx fought against God, it was against a God who had become beholden to bourgeois society, that indeed Marx unconsciously perhaps deum propter Deum relinquat.² But under the followers of Marx demonization set in, it is they who have absolutized the proletariat. One has but to see the numerous Russian paintings of the oppressed laborer of the capitalist society, to realize that they absolutize and hence demonize what Tillich eagerly acknowledges as the Form in which historical grace is forthcoming in our ailing society, namely, the proletariat, but the proletariat can be truly an expression of grace only when it

¹Interp 193.

² 1 Kai 4-6.

transcends itself. For the ultimate victory of true socialism is dependent on the possession of inner might, attained by subjecting itself "to the idea, which, by transcending power, stabilizes and consecrates all power."¹ But Communism absolutizes the power of the proletariat. And in this absolutization Communism has failed to grasp the conditionedness of man and history. Like the prophets of old, the Marxists grasp the demands for our time. In that respect they are kairic. But they fail to understand the full dynamic of history, for they envisage a static society as their goal. That is to say, they recognize that man is conditioned, but by economics, not the Unconditioned, the Lord of history. Consequently as soon as the means of production are in the hands of all there will no longer be any movement in history. As Marx says, prehistory will have come to an end, and true history will have begun. But, Tillich adds emphatically, so will true eventfulness and meaningfulness have come to an end. The age of "history" as Marx understands it will have no dynamic unless the Marxists penetrate behind economic forms and recognize God the Conditioner of all.²

Tillich thus criticizes Marxism for absorbing the mechanistic attitude of bourgeois technical realism and projecting bourgeois in-sich-ruhende society into the future. Like technical realism Communism has no understanding of the warm sustaining forces that connect man with the earth. Communism is an urban ideology. It is atomistic. While it grasps the prophetic it has completely misunderstood what Tillich calls the priestly without which a community cannot be formed. "The Eternal however enters time not only in the prophetic but also

¹Interp 202.

²Rv 134.

in the priestly spirit. The priestly is the motherly, bearing principle, also the cosmic warmth, the empounding of which makes possible the prophetic tensions and outbursts,"¹ which prepare for new meaning. It is certain "that without the priestly spirit an overwhelming of the spirit of bourgeois society is impossible; there can be only spasmodic onslaught, after which the complacency of self-satisfied finitude will be restored."²

Moreover in its materialistic mood inherited from bourgeois autonomy, communism goes to an extreme. It is a Demonry, because it destroys a Demonry which spawns mass men only to establish a society that idealizes mass men.

¹ 1 Kai 12.

² 1 Kai 13.

C. SIN IN RELATION TO SALVATION

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17. Sin and Faith

We may conclude a somewhat rambling survey of the manifestations of sin by saying that Tillich recognizes¹ three types of sin; sin which is deterioration like lassitude; sin which is deformation or creative-destructiveness, the Demonries; and sin which is ~~dis~~pair. These three manifestations of sin are alike in being destructive. They lead to nothingness. The case of deteriorative sin is obvious. The relation between ~~dis~~pair and nothingness is also apparent. "The desperation of the profane attitude is emptiness of meaning and the desperation of the holy attitude is emptiness of form."² The relation between deformation and nothingness requires, however, some elucidation, for on the surface it would appear that Demonries do not lead to nothingness, but flourish instead.

According to Tillich, demonic sin exists as a dialectical tension under the No and the Yes of God, that is to say, it is affirmed by God at the very moment it is denied, for sin is its own destruction and denial. "The end of evil is that it is entirely divided from goodness and is rejected as complete unreality. 'For the bad, when it is entirely separated from the good, exists no longer even as evil. It could work only through the misused good that was unconsciously contained in it. . . . in dying, however, it is divided from all that is good and remains behind indeed as lust, as eternal hunger and

¹Interp 225.

²These are really my own distinctions. The basis for them is Tillich's assertion that not all sin is demonic.

and thirst after reality, but without being able to emerge from potentiality. . . .¹ The Wrath of God is therefore according to Schelling not a judgment from outside, but the sin itself, seen from the viewpoint of its immanent self-destruction. Precisely in the act in which God permits the sinner to harbor the will to sin, thereby affirming this will as will, He condemns it."² Mark the unjust for the end of that man or people is destruction. Sin is its own punishment, for the more intensely destructive a Demonry becomes, the less is it able to exist. Tillich thus distinguishes Demonries by the intensity of the destructive urge or malice within them. Demonries range from subtle destructiveness, to wanton destructiveness, to fiendish destructiveness.

But the worst Demonries are not the ones that border on the Satanic, for their end is quick, but rather the Demonries which contain in them much that is creative.³ Satan, in order to be tempting, must disguise himself as wisdom or voluptuousness. Sin is not consciously engaged in unless there is something to commend it. In the survey of the manifestation of sin one is doubtless impressed by the fact that Tillich stresses Demonries which by the pious or the enthusiastic might be considered good rather than sinful. Indeed Tillich again and again shows that what may be at one time considered a Form of grace is at another time thought of as a Demonry. It is this awareness of the closeness of sin and grace and of sin and destruction (and also his stress on the sociality of sin) that constitute the richness and depth of Tillich's doctrine. His

¹This sentence is quoted by Tillich from Schelling.

²Mystik 116-7.

³Boehme on whom Tillich is ultimately dependent showed in his writings that sin is power which through Godwardness may become a power for righteousness.

description and analysis of the dialectic of sin and grace which can often be distinguished only by a hair's breadth explains how demonical possession can be confused with ecstatic blessedness, how the righteously indignant prophet can be branded an anarchist, how hypocrisy can be confused with devotion. Moreover Tillich's insight into the destruction that is contained in creation and the creativeness that is contained in destruction throws light on why concupiscence has been held up almost symbolically as the mainspring of Original Sin. Sex has indeed in many religions received this significance as symbolic of the All-creative and all-destroying power. At the same time Tillich's insight also explains why pride vies with concupiscence as the first sin in Paradise, for pride in the very moment it vaunteth itself is on the way to destruction. Him whom the gods would destroy they first make mad.

If, as the experience of mankind testifies, sin as presumption leads to destruction and nothingness, and moreover if religious experience proclaims that contrition for sin or repentance is preparatory to the reception of grace, it is natural that the present study of Tillich's understanding of sin conclude with his analysis of how man becomes aware of his sinfulness which is so essential a step in his salvation. We shall first point out the relation between sin consciousness and faith and then go on to the relation between repentance and the Kingdom.

Before entering upon the problem of awakening to an awareness of sin, the problem of salvation from sin by faith, it is necessary to note Tillich's distinctions in the meaning of faith. All-transforming faith is not the same as holding true uncertain objects (Fürwahrhalten). Faith is an openness

to the Unconditioned, an orientation of the whole being to God and His commands, a trusting attitude and demeanor. Moreover, Tillich distinguishes autonomous Fürwahrhalten which is really unbelief from heteronomous belief. "Heteronomous belief is faith even though demonically distorted, while autonomous unbelief is never demonic, also of course never divine; it is empty obedience to the law."¹ In the history of religions, especially the Jewish Law, it may be the Catholic sacramental law and system, or it may be the law of supposedly self-sufficient selfness. That is to say, of autonomy. Salvation from the despair into which these laws lead one is through faith as trust. Paul found salvation from the Law through Christ. Luther found salvation from sacramental works likewise through faith. It is now our task to show how Tillich finds salvation by faith and how he relates his thought and experience to the traditional concepts of sin and salvation.

For Tillich's point of departure is the recognition of the fact that the man of today finds the expressions "sin" and "justification by faith" hard to understand. His task is thus to equate the traditional expressions with the words that designate the same experiences of the soul in the man of the twentieth century. And he finds that the sense of cosmic and personal meaninglessness is the equivalent of sin consciousness, while the assurance of an adequate purpose in the universe is similar to the experience of salvation. Justification by faith in the world today would thus be assurance strong, that life will be fulfilled in larger measure. Tillich points out, however, that justification by faith, even when understood in the expressions of the day, cannot be actually experienced

¹Rph 803.

without the assurance that both Paul and Luther had, namely, that God exists and concerns Himself with men. The problem of salvation in the modern world is thus more complex than it was in the world of Paul and in the world of Luther. The autonomous man knows no Law written by God. The autonomous man knows no Church founded by the Lord. He does not even know that God exists. His only law is his own law (autonomy). When Paul and Luther exultantly proclaimed that the Good News is no other than the forgiveness of sins for all who are repentant, the background against which the Gospel stood out in welcome relief was the century-long conviction of the necessity of the Law and works. And now it was declared that God requireth only the contrite heart.¹ For both Paul and Luther this was the release that the salvatory Revelation of Christ vouchsafed to them.

The problem of Tillich is thus to show wherein the man of today may know that his despair of meaning is sinful, that indeed his whole conduct is sinful before God. It becomes thus apparent why Tillich is set upon the task of awakening man to his sinfulness; for this purpose Tillich fashions his concept of the Demonic to the end that if not first in the personal, then perhaps in the social realm people will come to feel their guilt and responsibility, their need of contrition and repentance, the only mood in which the life of religion can strike root, for Christ came into the world to save sinners.

A despairer or doubter feels sinful, however, only in the presence of God. It is thus Tillich's task to show the relation between doubt and despair, the basic Revelation of God and sin.

¹The prophets declared the same message in respect to the sacramental system. "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and walk humbly with thy God."

"The doubter in the religiously meaningful sense is that person who with the loss of religious immediacy has lost the truth and the meaning of life or is in some stage of losing them and who yet cannot reconcile himself to this loss, but is moved by the need to find meaning, truth, and God. The doubter is that person whom the law of truth has clamped upon with ruthless force the Demonry of intellectualism leading to despair and who moves in the direction of despair because he cannot fulfill the law, autonomy . The doubter finds himself thus in the position of one who despairs of salvation, but in such a way that his affliction Unheil is not felt to be his condemnation by God, but rather the yawning chasm of utter nothingness."¹ The doubter gropes in desperation although he may make many attempts to give his life meaning. He may make a volitional attempt to achieve certainty. Mysticism is one form of this effort but it never satisfies because it can always be shoved aside as something relative and conditioned. Another act of will is the "so-called wager which in reality is an experiment with God and therefore blasphemous."² Or he may make an emotional attempt to achieve certainty "through awakening feelings in which the Divine is expected to make His presence felt. This also remains completely in the conditioned sphere and is not capable of communicating unconditioned certainty."³ Or there is the intellectual attempt. The doubter may refuse to fight through his doubt to the bitter end and thus conceal the bitterness of his life by a compromise, which beguiles him into thinking that he is making continuous progress in mastering the truth while really he is rendering himself unaware of his loss of the unconditioned truth. All these

¹Rechtf 23.

²Rechtf 24.

³Rechtf 24.

attempts are of no avail. Moreover, it is the Protestant duty to challenge the presumptions of man continuously. Protestantism must hold man to the border situation, force him to the brink repeatedly until his complacency is shattered and he is filled with Angst. For at first "religion is the experience of the unconditioned and that means the experience of sheer Reality on the basis of experiencing sheer nothingness--the nothingness of personal life. Wherever this experience has led, however, to an absolute No, it changes over into an equally absolute experience of Reality as a radical Yes."¹ This unexpected "basic Revelation means an emancipation from the despair of doubt and the emptiness of meaning,"² even though it means the anguish of guilt for having despaired and doubted God's existence. Man at this moment becomes conscious of God even though He be a wrathful God who holds him responsible for his sinful unbelief. For all his agony and remorse, however, the sinner, that is to say the sometime doubter, has at least the solace of having been found by God. Luther expressed it when he exclaimed that he wanted God to know of him, to turn in his direction, even if only to smite him. For it is exactly at that moment of realizing one's sin, while shuddering before the Wrath of God, that actually one is nearer God than ever before. Guilt consciousness is fundamental to all religious life, repentance the first act of the Christian believer. Thus "the basic Revelation is a freeing from the despair of doubt and meaninglessness. To that extent it is the beginning of salvatory Revelation, which is the emancipation from contrariety

¹Kth 35. This is an experience comparable to the experience of the mysterium tremendum et fascinosum. Rechtf 28.

²Rechtf 30.

and apartness from God."¹ For the negative prerequisite and at the same time the effect of salvatory Revelation is guilt consciousness."²

The importance of this sin consciousness as a stage in the experience of salvation cannot be overstressed, for the recognition of evil represents a step towards its elimination. So important did Augustine regard the awakening to a sense of sin, that he actually called the communication of this sin consciousness to the homo aeger a kind of grace. Tillich likewise regards the wrath of God as a Form of grace. When the sinner realizes the extent of his wickedness, in Tillich's words when he becomes aware of his participation in the Demonries, the personal and the social, he is nearer God than ever before.

It is from these Demonries that salvatory Revelation saves him. But no longer, at least, does he despair of meaning, for through the basic Revelation a realization of God's concern for the world has been imparted to him. Salvatory Revelation is as sudden and overwhelming as is basic Revelation. In the presence of salvatory Revelation a strange reversal takes place. The wrathful demonic hand of God which has shaken the sinner is realized to be in the sinner himself; sin and destruction are seen to be two aspects of the same experience; God is glimpsed as not truly wrathful but full of mercy and forgiveness. "This God is called the Father of Jesus Christ."³

This salvatory Revelation of God in Christ is both a now and a then, that is to say, a fact of human experience today and a fact in the history of religion. Let us consider salvation by faith in Christ first from the point of view of the religious history. We have already isolated the Protestant principle. It is a thunderous No to the law. We have not,

¹Rechtf 30.

²Rechtf 31.

³Rechtf 31.

however, brought out the other side which is equally important, namely, that the law too is of God. That is to say, sacramentalism and theocracy are expressions of grace. Throughout the history of religion there must be in view of the dynamic nature of God an alternation between the outburst of grace, which is prophecy and realization of grace which proclaims a Yes and drapes itself in religious forms like the cultus and the law. Both are essential.¹ They constitute the dynamic of religion and Revelation. But in no religion, according to Tillich, is the affirmation of man's life despite his sin so emphatically proclaimed as in Christianity. From the viewpoint of the history of religion, the salvatory Revelation of Christ represents "an emancipation from the bondage to fear characteristic of paganism and from the guilt consciousness of Judaism. The wrath principle is overcome inwardly through God the Son. There is only one possibility of reaching this goal, namely, that God place Himself under wrath and give Himself up to it to the point of 'exhaustion'. God assumes the form of selfness and places Himself under its curse, in order to hold communion with them who are bound to selfness. He releases from the power of the pagan principle, He redeems through overcoming indignation (Unwillen), He justifies by recognizing the condition of separateness from God, He establishes also the religious community in which as a Person He ministers to persons and as an Individual confronts the individual. He overcomes contrariety by affirming it and placing Himself under it."² Paul, the despairing and sin conscious legalist, grasped and was grasped by this salvatory Revelation. By the salvatory Revelation of the Good News likewise Luther, the devout and conscientious

¹Rechtf 20.

²Mystik 133-4.

but ever dissatisfied monk, was seized and delivered from the bondage of works.

The meaning of Christ's salvatory Revelation is, according to Tillich, the same for sin conscious man of today, for the man who knows there is meaning in life but who nevertheless seems forced by historical circumstances to participate in the Demonries of his age. Faith in Christ's Revelation fills the modern believer, according to Tillich's understanding of justification, with a two-fold conviction.

Christ's self-immolation becomes for the believer, the self-transcending symbol of the overcoming of selfness. It will be recalled from the discussion of Original Sin that Tillich regards selfness, however necessary it may be for existence, to be the cause of man's Fall. Christ's Redemption is thus interpreted as symbolic of the divine affirmation of man's selfness while at the same time overcoming it and pointing beyond the individual to universal salvation, that is to say in effect, social salvation. Thus the greatness of the Cross lies in its affirmation through negation. Its power lies in its representation of "the will to selfness, intensified into divine will to power, offering up itself and thus denying itself. 'The truly Infinite became finite, not in order to deify finitude, but rather in order in its own person to sacrifice God and thereby make Atonement.'¹

Thus for Tillich salvation from sin through Christ "no longer means the release of the individual out of imperfect existence, but rather the conquest and extermination of evil from all existence. It is not a melting unison with the Eternal One, but a realization of the Kingdom of God, that is,

¹Mystik 119. The last sentence is quoted from Schelling.

divinity united through strength and love."¹

Closely bound up with the affirmation and negation of selfness through the Revelation of the Cross is Christ's Revelation of the salvatory character of history, that is to say, Christ's appearance in history becomes for the believer the Center of history which is thereupon understood as the place where salvation takes place. Christ is the Incarnate Lord of history. Consequently the salvatory grace which renders life meaningful will come in historical forms, and since the Lord of history is dynamic, these gifts that enable man to achieve meaningfulness in time are changing forms.² Tillich defines this meaning-giving Center of history as that place when and that occasion when fate and decision, gripping and being gripped, interpenetrate. That occasion and place has been for Christendom Christ.³ To be grasped by Center of history is to be taken hold of by an unconditioned power. The fate whereby this transcendent possession of oneself takes place is known theologically as predestination, which is an assertion of the fact that God comes to man and not man to God. "The decision in which the

¹Marx 23. Tillich relegates the early Christian concern for personal immortality to the status of a secondary problem. Rl 111, Rv 138, Rv 291. Moreover inasmuch as Tillich regards selfness as the root of all evil it must be expected that he would regard death as the universal assertion that individuality cannot be the basis of salvation. Actually, however, he remains non-committal.

²One of the principal manifestations of historical grace today is, as has already been mentioned, the proletarian movement which provides salvation for Sinful humanity caught in the Demonry of Capitalism. Of this we shall have more to say in the paragraph on Sin and the Kingdom.

³Rv 121. There can be theoretically several middles to history, but such a possibility can only be an abstraction, put forward extrahistorically, for every middle sets itself up as the Middle.

Eternal Seizer der Ergreifende is grasped is transcendent decision or faith. Only for faith is Christ the Center of history, but only through Christ as the middle of history is faith in him possible."¹ Once one has grasped and been grasped, then history is seen to be the means of salvation, whereupon the individual becomes both tremendously important and desperately insignificant, for history is not the place where man is for his own sake, but rather the place where the Transcendent is realized and existence acquires meaning.²

¹Rv 124.

²Rv 128.

18. Sin and the Kingdom.

In the discussion of the relation between sin and salvation in Tillich's theology we have thus far confined our attention to sin in respect to faith. Faith, we have seen, is vouchsafed through Revelation. First there is basic Revelation which discloses the abysmal character of God. Rocked and shaken man realizes his sinful nature. He becomes aware of his conditionedness and of the onesidedness of the Demonries in which he has perhaps unwittingly participated, and he shudders before God's accusing finger. The anguish into which he is plunged is subsequently relieved by salvatory Revelation which is mediated through Christ, disclosing that the demonic destructiveness, which was at first interpreted as God's Wrath, is really within man himself. Moreover salvatory Revelation discloses that God is full of mercy and forgiveness, specifically, that in the Revelation through Christ the believer is assured of the meaningfulness of history which is therewith understood as the theater of salvation. Accordingly, if history is disclosed as the scene of salvation, then salvatory grace must appear in an historical form. Tillich asserts that every Kairos has its salvation, if man but decide in favor of the proffered grace. Bourgeois autonomous society, overridden as it is by all kinds of Demonries, will achieve redemption in our Kairos through availing itself of the grace bestowed upon our parlous age by the Lord of history. Through the acceptance of this proffered gift our sin-riddled society may be transformed into a more nearly perfect symbol of the Kingdom. And insofar as we become subjects of it, the Kingdom is indeed already among us in the

sense that through our socio-historical conduct the Eschaton, which is the Transcendent in its aspect as the goal of history, although never encased in conditioned forms, may be at least symbolized by the God-mindful and God-sustained society in which we participate. It will be noted that Tillich's conception of a theonomous society, symbolizing the Kingdom in history, differs fundamentally from the Utopian and progressivist notions of an immanent Kingdom, fully and statically realized by man. The principal difference lies in Tillich's recognition of man's conditionedness and God's Lordship of history.

It is appropriate that we conclude our study of Tillich's understanding of sin by showing the relationship which is sustained between sin and repentance and the immanent-transcendent Kingdom as Tillich understands it.

In Christ as the Center of history is revealed also a Beginning and an End. Mytho-theologically the Beginning has been known as Creation. The important thing about Creation is that God called it good. But Man through the misuse of his free will fell from God's sustaining grace and cast thereby a gloom over the whole world. Then God in His mercy provided for man's salvation through the Atonement which constitutes the third act of the spiritual drama. The last act is the coming of the Kingdom, which is the End implied by Christ as the atoning Center. The End or the Eschaton is symbolized in the language of religion by two expressions, the Kingdom and the Last Judgment. All of these are metaphysical, religious symbols of the Transcendent which is dynamic. The Proton is the Transcendent reference for the whence of history and all life. The Eschaton is the transcendent reference of the goal of history. And just as the Transcendent can never be capsuled in any conditioned form,

so the Proton and the Eschaton can only be symbolized by the configurations of the world; they can never be realized in the world. In other words the Kingdom will always be at hand. It can never actually be.¹

The Kingdom is the transcendent realm of fulfillment, the anticipated realization of existence as meaningful being. The Kingdom as a symbol embraces thus the transcendent meaning of everything that happens in time.² It is the unconditioned Perfected. The end of every happening is to stand in the Kingdom, for in so doing it reaches its goal. The Kingdom is thus for every historical event alike near and distant. The hour cometh and now is. Nearness and not-yetness, creative expectancy, these are descriptions of the Kingdom which is in one, insofar as it is of the Beyond. The picture of the Kingdom ushered in by a final catastrophe is only a mythical expression of a psycho-historical truth.³

The second symbol, the Last Judgment, is the transcendent reference of our temporal decisions. It is the transcendent occasion of our life of decision. And "this decision is always against the meaningless withdrawal of time into space, a decision for meaning against the ultimate, even though ever so concealed, senselessness of existence."⁴

The relation between this salvatory decision (Judgment) for a fulness of meaning in the historical community (the Kingdom, symbolized) and repentance for sin, understood as remorse and anguish for participation in the Demonries which hold back the Kingdom, may be stated as follows: God the Unconditioned as the Lord of History fulfills Himself in many ways. The

¹Cf chart page 34.

²Rv 139.

³Rv 138.

⁴Rl 114.

historical Forms of grace vary with the age. In our Kairos, characterized by the Demonries of aestheticism, intellectualism, capitalism, and nationalism, historical salvation from threatened meaninglessness and destruction is provided preeminently by the appearance of the proletarian movement. Salvation comes to our complacent society only when it repents of its participation in the Demonries and cries out for succor. Christianity is today as always the religion of sinners. To the rationalists it must seem foolishness and to the progressivists and Utopians a stumbling block. To the Pharisees it can be of no meaning, for they do what is right according to the law. They are the complacent churchgoers who dutifully and perhaps even devoutly hold to the conditioned standards of a previous age without recognizing the demands of the present. But true Christianity can be meaningful to them only when they realize their sin and repent. Salvation from the plight of bourgeois autonomy and its attendant Demonries can come only through repentance and faith, a faith that trusts in the necessity and the ultimate meaningfulness of historical change, a faith that is not only a trusting attitude but an eager and trustful conduct. Salvation means the acceptance of the proffered grace, to the end that by our decision history is prevented from demonic deflection and our century escape a long period of distortion.

Thus we close with the words of the opening chapter. Upon a flood tide are we now afloat. It is ours to decide whether Protestantism will accept proletarian socialism as its prophetic outburst and by so doing provide this form-creative, form-destructive force with the richness of a priestly tradition with all its impounded warmth and wisdom, to the end that socialism become religious and society turn Godward. Thus will emerge a Godfearing culture, ever open to the Transcendent, a culture religion whose teachers will be the great creative philosophers, whose priests will be the artists, whose prophets will be the seers of a new personal and communal ethic, whose bishops will be the leaders to ever new and noble goals, whose deacons will be the directors of industry in the interests of all the community (Ktk 45). Through communal salvation by theonomous living under the continuous challenge and inspiration of the Kingdom, society will have overcome the Demonries, the personal and the social; the yea-saying and the nay-saying; the heteronomous and the autonomous.

Repent ye for the Kingdom of God is at hand.

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